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The coming week is looking to be quite interesting when it comes to global relations. We expect to see the first of what might turn out to be several summits between US President Donald Trump and China’s leader, Xi Jinping. What can we expect? There is much speculation about this and we will try to sketch out the likeliest results but you never know when Donald Trump is in the spotlight.
But just before going there, I think it useful to take a quick look at the state of Trump tariffs. Why? Well, interestingly, there has been yet another blow to Trump’s favorite policy instrument, tariffs. As described by a former colleague, and well known international trade law lawyer, Barry Appleton, here is what went down as he describes it in his Substack:
“The Court of International Trade has struck down President Trump’s 10% global surcharge. The decision arrives in different rooms in different ways.”
“On May 7, 2026, by a 2-1 vote, the United States Court of International Trade struck down President Trump’s 10% global Section 122 tariff. The decision is technical, narrow, and divided. It runs eighty-eight pages and is published as Slip Op. 26-47.”
“The substantive holding is straightforward. Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 requires “balance-of-payments deficits” measured by the methods Congress understood in 1974, not by current-account or trade-deficit data. The President’s February 20 Proclamation pointed to the wrong concept and was therefore ultra vires.”
Now this end to his immediate Section 122 efforts, is on top of his previously failed effort to use the IEEPA – the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Here, the US Supreme Court struck down Trump’s actions to impose tariffs using this IEEPA which forced him to pivot to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. Now that this more recent Trump tariff approach also has been struck down, in this case by the United States Court of International Trade, is this it? Nope. These failed efforts don’t likely end Trump’s tariff moves. I expect that we will see several Section 301 ‘unfair trade practice’reports that will apply tariffs to specific trade items. But still the recent trade decisions have certainly thrown a wrench in Trump tariff initiatives and actions. And the Section 301 efforts are more targeted, not universal as displayed in earlier tariff actions.
Okay. Let’s now turn to this upcoming Trump-Xi Summit. Now this May 14-15th Summit between the two leaders, assuming it goes forward, is, in fact, a rescheduled summit that was earlier postponed apparently because of the Iran war. There has been a lot of speculation of what we might expect from this meeting. With Trump certainly nothing is guaranteed but here is where experts assess what is most likely to occur.
First from The Economist with the foreign policy editor, Robert Graves:
“It is sometimes said, not least by President Donald Trump, that America and China are now the G2, a duo of superpowers leading the world. That is a grim thought. One has a leader who treats allies like patsies and is ripping apart the institutions that underpinned global stability for decades. The other has an authoritarian regime that bullies its neighbours and is quietly stoking foreign conflicts it could help defuse.”
“Worse, the two countries treat their mutual entanglements on technology and trade as security risks. So the stakes will be huge when Mr Trump visits Xi Jinping, China’s paramount leader, in Beijing on May 14th and 15th, the first of four expected meetings before the end of 2026.”
“Tensions between the two governments run so deep that it would be naive to expect a breakthrough. Had they more skill and humility, Mr Trump and Mr Xi could head off the most harmful conflicts and find areas where they could work together for everyone’s benefit. It is unsettling that so much will come down to Mr Trump, who has veered between calling Mr Xi a dear friend and a foe.” …
“Alas, the two leaders both think that co-operation is a trap in which rules could be foisted on them by the other side. That logic makes dominance the priority, not global public goods.”
“So the summit will probably yield little besides forced smiles. Such a lack of ambition is troubling.”
Now at Brookings various experts set out their projected summit outcomes with most suggesting a modest result as the most likely. As Jonathan Czin suggested:
“Outside observers should have low expectations for the upcoming summit between Trump and Xi. While the relationship has stabilized since the two leaders met last November, it remains fragile—defined more by an absence of friction than any affirmative agenda or deep dialogue on the substantial differences that bedevil the relationship.”
Ryan Hass of Brookings suggested the following:
“To be clear, there will be outcomes from Trump’s visit. Both leaders will likely announce Chinese purchases of American products, such as Boeing airplanes and agricultural goods. … “So long as the visit proceeds smoothly and Trump concludes he was treated respectfully, then the uneasy calm in the bilateral relationship will endure. If, on the other hand, Trump leaves feeling disrespected or trifled with, then he could have a change of heart.”
In a separate Brookings Commentary, Patricia Kim, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, Center for Asia Policy Studies, Brookings suggested this as the possible result from the meeting:
“The most likely outcome is a year focused on stability—extending the trade truce and avoiding escalation while both sides strengthen their positions. It could, however, evolve into something more ambitious, with expanded cooperation on trade or strategic issues—or shift in a more adversarial direction if Trump walks away dissatisfied with the results of the trip.”
And finally Michael Froman, the President of CFR, suggested these conclusions in his, The World This Week:
“Gone is any pretense of solving the major structural issues at the heart of the world’s most important bilateral relationship: China’s mercantilist economic model, its designs on absorbing Taiwan, and its active support of U.S. adversaries such as Iran and Russia, not to mention any discussion of freedom of navigation through the South China Sea. As such, the summit is unlikely to alter the character and course of the U.S.-China relationship long-term. It is about managing for stability, not solving outstanding concerns.”
“The appeal of this pragmatic, tactical, and transactional approach is understandable. Decades of ambitious, if wishful thinking about the United States’ ability to influence the Communist Party of China on core elements of its economic or national security priorities have borne little fruit. Having a clear-eyed view and pragmatic expectations is not necessarily a sign of weakness. But there is a difference between measured cynicism and complacency. At some point, the fundamental issues at the heart of the U.S.-China relationship will need to be resolved, lest they boil over.”
Now there is a view that there might be more tangible results than just an affirmation of stability and a willingness to purchase US aircraft or agricultural crops like soybeans. There is apparently some discussion of a Board of Trade. Though Graves at The Economist is not necessarily pleased but he did identify this potentially new bilateral institution:
“Mr Trump’s misplaced faith in tariffs makes cuts unrealistic, but holding them at current levels would at least let firms get on with business. The Americans want a Board of Trade to manage commerce between the two countries. That would be unwieldy and would do little to re-industrialise America. A mechanism for regular dialogue would be better.”
And there is even some view that a Board of Investment may be in the wind.
Now it seems that the US has focused on trade rather than security. As Guest suggests, again, in The Economist:
“American negotiators have kept the summit’s lead-up focused on trade, not security. But the Chinese spot an opportunity in the American president’s unpredictability. They may be right. Just as Chinese advisers are afraid to contradict Mr Xi, so officials in the White House defer to Mr Trump on all things China, including Taiwan.”
There is concern, expressed by a number of experts, including Graves again, that Trump may fail to hold to the semantic lines that define US statements to China on the issue of Taiwan:
“American negotiators have kept the summit’s lead-up focused on trade, not security. But the Chinese spot an opportunity in the American president’s unpredictability. They may be right. Just as Chinese advisers are afraid to contradict Mr Xi, so officials in the White House defer to Mr Trump on all things China, including Taiwan.”
“And it is there Mr Trump may think he can lower the temperature by going soft. Chinese officials hint that the more he bends on Taiwan, the more China will give on trade. They hope he might cut arms sales to the island or say he is against Taiwanese independence. He should not take the bait. It would be wrong to sell out a democratic partner and reckless to endanger the world’s essential chipmaker.”
As pointed out by Elliot Waldman, the Editor in Chief at WPR:
“With a Trump-Xi summit set for next week, Beijing on Thursday again stressed that Taiwan would top the agenda, with a Foreign Ministry spokesman saying that U.S. adherence to the “one China principle” is the precondition for any durable improvement in bilateral ties. Separately, Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Beijing with a bipartisan U.S. congressional delegation led by Sen. Steve Daines, a Republican from Montana and Trump ally. The Trump-Xi meeting is scheduled for May 14-15.”
“Beijing’s emphasis on Taiwan ahead of the summit aligns with Mary Gallagher’s analysis in WPR in November. China’s so-called “four red lines”—Taiwan; democracy and human rights; China’s political system; and its right to economic development—are “not just a laundry list of interests” but “represent critical areas of vulnerability that the ruling Communist Party wants to safeguard against,” Gallagher wrote. And the unifying thread running through all four, she argued, is “Beijing’s overarching concern that U.S. defense and support for Taiwan is increasingly linked not to the Cold War but to Taiwan’s identity as a vibrant East Asian democracy.””
There is general agreement but no consensus on what is likely to result from the Summit. And with Donald Trump at the US helm, that is probably a wise thing. We will watch closely, however.
