2018 |
Weiss, Thomas G The UN and Multilateralism under Siege in the “Age of Trump” Journal Article Global Summitry, 4 (1), pp. 1-17, 2018, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Weiss2018, title = {The UN and Multilateralism under Siege in the “Age of Trump” }, author = {Thomas G Weiss}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.1.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy013}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {1-17}, abstract = {This essay poses two questions: “Would the World Be Better without the UN?” and “Would the World Be Better without Donald Trump?” The answers are “No” and “Yes.” It begins by discussing the UN’s value and continues by probing the historical context of U.S. approaches to multilateralism and Washington’s unhesitating leadership during World War II, an era as fraught as ours. It then analyzes the implications of the Trump Administration’s “America First” policy on the United Nations and considers the possibilities for concerted international action without Washington. It concludes by examining the odds that the world body can become fitter-for-purpose. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This essay poses two questions: “Would the World Be Better without the UN?” and “Would the World Be Better without Donald Trump?” The answers are “No” and “Yes.” It begins by discussing the UN’s value and continues by probing the historical context of U.S. approaches to multilateralism and Washington’s unhesitating leadership during World War II, an era as fraught as ours. It then analyzes the implications of the Trump Administration’s “America First” policy on the United Nations and considers the possibilities for concerted international action without Washington. It concludes by examining the odds that the world body can become fitter-for-purpose. |
Doyle, Michael; Borgnäs, Emma The Model International Mobility Convention: Finding a Path to a Better International Mobility Regime Journal Article Global Summitry, 4 (1), pp. 18-29, 2018, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Doyle2018, title = {The Model International Mobility Convention: Finding a Path to a Better International Mobility Regime }, author = {Michael Doyle and Emma Borgnäs}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.2.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy008}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {18-29}, abstract = {After nearly two years of study and debate convened by the Columbia Global Policy Initiative's International Migration Project, the Model International Mobility Convention (MIMC) represents a consensus among over forty academics and policymakers in the fields of migration, human rights, national security, labor economics, and refugee law. The MIMC provides a holistic and rights-based approach to international mobility that integrates the various regimes that seek to govern people on the move. In addition, it fills key gaps in international law that leave many people unprotected by establishing the minimum rights afforded to all people who cross state borders—whether as visitors, tourists, students, workers, residents, entrepreneurs, forced migrants, refugees, victims of trafficking, people caught in countries in crisis, and family members—and defines their relationships to their communities of destination, origin, and transit (The Model International Mobility Convention. 2018. The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. JTL Special Issue 56(2)). }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } After nearly two years of study and debate convened by the Columbia Global Policy Initiative's International Migration Project, the Model International Mobility Convention (MIMC) represents a consensus among over forty academics and policymakers in the fields of migration, human rights, national security, labor economics, and refugee law. The MIMC provides a holistic and rights-based approach to international mobility that integrates the various regimes that seek to govern people on the move. In addition, it fills key gaps in international law that leave many people unprotected by establishing the minimum rights afforded to all people who cross state borders—whether as visitors, tourists, students, workers, residents, entrepreneurs, forced migrants, refugees, victims of trafficking, people caught in countries in crisis, and family members—and defines their relationships to their communities of destination, origin, and transit (The Model International Mobility Convention. 2018. The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. JTL Special Issue 56(2)). |
Draper, Peter; Freytag, Andreas; Dörffel, Christoph; Schuhmann, Sebastian Trade, Inclusive Development, and the Global Order Journal Article Global Summitry, 4 (1), pp. 30-49, 2018, ISSN: https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guz001, (Article). @article{Draper2018, title = {Trade, Inclusive Development, and the Global Order }, author = {Peter Draper and Andreas Freytag and Christoph Dörffel and Sebastian Schuhmann}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.3.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guz001}, issn = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guz001}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {30-49}, abstract = {Economic globalization has increasingly affected countries across the world, through participation in global value chains (GVCs) and helping to lift over one billion human beings out of extreme poverty since 1990. However, there are still too many people living in poverty, even in rich countries, and so concerns over exclusion of certain groups from the gains of economic globalization are rising internationally. Using the concept of inclusiveness based on Amartya Sen’s capability approach, we find that G20 countries perform better than non-G20 countries. We then review how economic theory contributes to understanding the causes of (missing) inclusiveness by reviewing the literature pertaining to five drivers: growth, technology, structural change, trade, and political economy. Overall, domestic policies tailored to specific national circumstances are the main instruments for promoting inclusiveness. The danger is that in pursuing these domestic policies, states may undermine international arrangements constituting the liberal economic order. We argue that the liberal economic order generates insufficient global governance because there is always a fraction of countries opposing global policy coordination as they believe it harms them, and that this group of countries is increasing propelled by the surge of populism. This dynamic implies that global governance focus will increasingly shift to “coalitions of the willing”, rendering multilateralism an increasingly challenging, and a la carte, proposition. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Economic globalization has increasingly affected countries across the world, through participation in global value chains (GVCs) and helping to lift over one billion human beings out of extreme poverty since 1990. However, there are still too many people living in poverty, even in rich countries, and so concerns over exclusion of certain groups from the gains of economic globalization are rising internationally. Using the concept of inclusiveness based on Amartya Sen’s capability approach, we find that G20 countries perform better than non-G20 countries. We then review how economic theory contributes to understanding the causes of (missing) inclusiveness by reviewing the literature pertaining to five drivers: growth, technology, structural change, trade, and political economy. Overall, domestic policies tailored to specific national circumstances are the main instruments for promoting inclusiveness. The danger is that in pursuing these domestic policies, states may undermine international arrangements constituting the liberal economic order. We argue that the liberal economic order generates insufficient global governance because there is always a fraction of countries opposing global policy coordination as they believe it harms them, and that this group of countries is increasing propelled by the surge of populism. This dynamic implies that global governance focus will increasingly shift to “coalitions of the willing”, rendering multilateralism an increasingly challenging, and a la carte, proposition. |
Rafferty, Devin T The IMF’s “New” Institutional View: An Unwitting Trojan Horse for International Financial Fragility Journal Article Global Summitry, 4 (1), pp. 50-63, 2018, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Rafferty2018, title = {The IMF’s “New” Institutional View: An Unwitting Trojan Horse for International Financial Fragility }, author = {Devin T Rafferty}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.4.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy005}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {50-63}, abstract = {In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), it became widely accepted that loosely regulated international capital flows were responsible for transmitting the crisis from the developed to the developing world. As a result, using capital controls to manage them came into vogue with many groups. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was one such actor, and its revamped policy proposals became encapsulated as its “New” Institutional View. It was here the Fund officially recognized the efficacy of controls for countering international financial fragility and stated the exact conditions under which they were acceptable. However, it also designated that authorities should retain a heavy preference for using “market-based” adjustment measures to correct capital flow-induced macroeconomic imbalances, even going as far as to mandate specific correctional paths and sequences for common individual scenarios, which indirectly relegated capital controls to secondary importance. This article argues these proposed adjustment measures are procyclical and hence the “New” Institutional View increases international financial fragility and impedes economic development. To do so, we combine Albert Hirschman’s vision of a development process with Hyman Minsky’s take on international financial instability to demonstrate this “View” is discordant with the challenges developing economies face. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), it became widely accepted that loosely regulated international capital flows were responsible for transmitting the crisis from the developed to the developing world. As a result, using capital controls to manage them came into vogue with many groups. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was one such actor, and its revamped policy proposals became encapsulated as its “New” Institutional View. It was here the Fund officially recognized the efficacy of controls for countering international financial fragility and stated the exact conditions under which they were acceptable. However, it also designated that authorities should retain a heavy preference for using “market-based” adjustment measures to correct capital flow-induced macroeconomic imbalances, even going as far as to mandate specific correctional paths and sequences for common individual scenarios, which indirectly relegated capital controls to secondary importance. This article argues these proposed adjustment measures are procyclical and hence the “New” Institutional View increases international financial fragility and impedes economic development. To do so, we combine Albert Hirschman’s vision of a development process with Hyman Minsky’s take on international financial instability to demonstrate this “View” is discordant with the challenges developing economies face. |
Cooper, Andrew F “Rising” States and Global Reach: Measuring “Globality” among BRICS/MIKTA Countries Journal Article Global Summitry, 4 (1), pp. 64-80, 2018, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Cooper2018, title = {“Rising” States and Global Reach: Measuring “Globality” among BRICS/MIKTA Countries }, author = {Andrew F Cooper}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guz002}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {64-80}, abstract = {Global reach is equated with national ambition. In the contemporary international system, one measure of global reach for states is their inclusion in global summits. This association is particularly compelling for putative “rising” states from the Global South, among the BRICS (China, India, and Brazil) and also a less well-known forum, MIKTA (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia) groupings. Yet the standard means of examining the attributes of rising states via country-specific and impressionistic studies appears to reveal that these rising powers are similar in many respects but there are significant differences as well. To help identify these differences we turn to a concept and data referred to as “globality.” We believe that this concept is helpful in more accurately analyzing the global reach of rising Global South countries. Though not that well known in the international relations literature, globality emphasizes agency by self-aware actors. Globality can be operationalized by tracing certain dimensions: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance. Broadly, the conclusion drawn from such a globality analysis substantiates a sharp distinction between the BRICS members and the MIKTA countries. The BRICS countries have some considerable capacity for global reach while it turns out that the MIKTA countries are regionally entrapped and thus less capable of global projection. Moreover, the specifics in terms of this pattern of differentiation are salient as well. The overall confirmation of the interconnection between subjective impressions of hierarchy and objective measurements of global projection underscores the contrast between BRICS and MIKTA in summitry dynamics. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Global reach is equated with national ambition. In the contemporary international system, one measure of global reach for states is their inclusion in global summits. This association is particularly compelling for putative “rising” states from the Global South, among the BRICS (China, India, and Brazil) and also a less well-known forum, MIKTA (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia) groupings. Yet the standard means of examining the attributes of rising states via country-specific and impressionistic studies appears to reveal that these rising powers are similar in many respects but there are significant differences as well. To help identify these differences we turn to a concept and data referred to as “globality.” We believe that this concept is helpful in more accurately analyzing the global reach of rising Global South countries. Though not that well known in the international relations literature, globality emphasizes agency by self-aware actors. Globality can be operationalized by tracing certain dimensions: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance. Broadly, the conclusion drawn from such a globality analysis substantiates a sharp distinction between the BRICS members and the MIKTA countries. The BRICS countries have some considerable capacity for global reach while it turns out that the MIKTA countries are regionally entrapped and thus less capable of global projection. Moreover, the specifics in terms of this pattern of differentiation are salient as well. The overall confirmation of the interconnection between subjective impressions of hierarchy and objective measurements of global projection underscores the contrast between BRICS and MIKTA in summitry dynamics. |
2017 |
Tiberghien, Yves Fostering Bold and Innovative Ideas for Urgent Global Challenges: The V20 Contribution to the G20 during the China–German Transition Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (1), pp. 27-44, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Tiberghien2017, title = {Fostering Bold and Innovative Ideas for Urgent Global Challenges: The V20 Contribution to the G20 during the China–German Transition }, author = {Yves Tiberghien }, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.1.2.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/gux008}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-09-23}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {27-44}, abstract = {Since its self-appointment as the core global economic “Steering Committee” of systematically important countries in 2008–2009, the G20 has been facing a growing number of functional demands. Only the G20 has the ability to address global systemic risks, coordinate macro-economic policies among the major economic countries, provided coherent leadership to international institutions, and reduce policy frictions between emerging and established powers. Yet, despite rising expectations toward the G20, its effectiveness, seemingly, has gradually decreased. Its role as a platform for grand bargains and responsible global management by top political leadership has been overtaken increasingly by technical small bargains and routinized communiqués written by experts that only provide small steps forward. Even the vigorous and dynamic G20 Chinese and German presidencies in 2016 and 2017, respectively, had to scale back ambitious global goals and settle for normative commitments and minor adjustments. In response, a network of scholars, think tank leaders, policy leaders, and societal leaders came together in 2016 and 2017 as the Vision 20 to offer a way forward, a process, and a set of concrete ideas to nudge the G20 toward its potential as a long-term oriented flexible institution that is able to anticipate large-scale common systemic risks and muster collective responses. At a time of growing geopolitical tensions caused by shifts in the global balance of power, securitization of economic flows, and a broad-based social backlash against inequalities and fears generated by globalization, innovative solutions for collective global governance are urgently needed. This article summarizes the dynamic that lead to the Vision 20 effort and its early results. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Since its self-appointment as the core global economic “Steering Committee” of systematically important countries in 2008–2009, the G20 has been facing a growing number of functional demands. Only the G20 has the ability to address global systemic risks, coordinate macro-economic policies among the major economic countries, provided coherent leadership to international institutions, and reduce policy frictions between emerging and established powers. Yet, despite rising expectations toward the G20, its effectiveness, seemingly, has gradually decreased. Its role as a platform for grand bargains and responsible global management by top political leadership has been overtaken increasingly by technical small bargains and routinized communiqués written by experts that only provide small steps forward. Even the vigorous and dynamic G20 Chinese and German presidencies in 2016 and 2017, respectively, had to scale back ambitious global goals and settle for normative commitments and minor adjustments. In response, a network of scholars, think tank leaders, policy leaders, and societal leaders came together in 2016 and 2017 as the Vision 20 to offer a way forward, a process, and a set of concrete ideas to nudge the G20 toward its potential as a long-term oriented flexible institution that is able to anticipate large-scale common systemic risks and muster collective responses. At a time of growing geopolitical tensions caused by shifts in the global balance of power, securitization of economic flows, and a broad-based social backlash against inequalities and fears generated by globalization, innovative solutions for collective global governance are urgently needed. This article summarizes the dynamic that lead to the Vision 20 effort and its early results. |
Cullenward, Danny California’s Foreign Climate Policy Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (1), pp. 1-26, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Feature Article). @article{Cullenward2017, title = {California’s Foreign Climate Policy }, author = {Danny Cullenward}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.1.1.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/gux007}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-09-08}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {1-26}, abstract = {California has been at the forefront of environmental policy for decades, relying on its unique legal authorities and economic scale to influence out-of-state actors and drive technological innovation in multiple sectors. In the early 2000s, the state developed a comprehensive climate policy framework and has since emphasized its external leadership role under two successive governors. With the U.S. federal government withdrawing from international climate policy, California’s place on the national and global stage has never been more prominent. Even though the U.S. Constitution formally prohibits states from having a foreign policy, when it comes to climate, California has one in all but name. Drawing on California’s rich history of environmental policy, this article evaluates past and current efforts to build multilateral climate policy cooperation at the state level. California is at once a proactive outlier—a subnational government with the political will and regulatory capacity to rival even the European Union’s policy regime—as well as a microcosm of the broader climate mitigation puzzle, where the problem of implementing aggressive targets looms large. In order to build on the state’s successful legacy, California policymakers should pursue strategies to: increase transparency in domestic policy and between the state’s partners abroad, increase cooperation within the state government, and minimize the legal risk of foreign policy preemption challenges. }, note = {Feature Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } California has been at the forefront of environmental policy for decades, relying on its unique legal authorities and economic scale to influence out-of-state actors and drive technological innovation in multiple sectors. In the early 2000s, the state developed a comprehensive climate policy framework and has since emphasized its external leadership role under two successive governors. With the U.S. federal government withdrawing from international climate policy, California’s place on the national and global stage has never been more prominent. Even though the U.S. Constitution formally prohibits states from having a foreign policy, when it comes to climate, California has one in all but name. Drawing on California’s rich history of environmental policy, this article evaluates past and current efforts to build multilateral climate policy cooperation at the state level. California is at once a proactive outlier—a subnational government with the political will and regulatory capacity to rival even the European Union’s policy regime—as well as a microcosm of the broader climate mitigation puzzle, where the problem of implementing aggressive targets looms large. In order to build on the state’s successful legacy, California policymakers should pursue strategies to: increase transparency in domestic policy and between the state’s partners abroad, increase cooperation within the state government, and minimize the legal risk of foreign policy preemption challenges. |
Herr, Trey Governing Proliferation in Cybersecurity Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (1), pp. 86-107, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Herr2017, title = {Governing Proliferation in Cybersecurity }, author = { Trey Herr}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.1.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/gux006}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-07-03}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {86-107}, abstract = {This article compares state activities to control the international spread of malware with efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The analysis focuses on representative institutions, the Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar) which began to address malware in 2013, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), comparing the origins, operation, and relative success of each. The article challenges the idea that PSI might serve as a successful model for countering malware proliferation, examining several basic questions about governing proliferation to offer insight into cybersecurity for the research and practitioner community. Looking at both intentional proliferation, through alliances, proxy relationships, or the malware markets, and unintentional proliferation, the article outlines key ideas in cybersecurity and underlines the challenges to governance. Concluding, the article argues PSI is a poor model to address malicious software, but that there are two substantive goals that may see more success: creating legal protections for cybersecurity research; and limiting the supply of software vulnerabilities available to attackers. Highlighting these differences between the approaches of Wassenaar and the PSI, this article presents cybersecurity as an interdependent ecosystem of people and ideas suitable for examination rather than being inaccessible or a purely technical space }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article compares state activities to control the international spread of malware with efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The analysis focuses on representative institutions, the Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar) which began to address malware in 2013, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), comparing the origins, operation, and relative success of each. The article challenges the idea that PSI might serve as a successful model for countering malware proliferation, examining several basic questions about governing proliferation to offer insight into cybersecurity for the research and practitioner community. Looking at both intentional proliferation, through alliances, proxy relationships, or the malware markets, and unintentional proliferation, the article outlines key ideas in cybersecurity and underlines the challenges to governance. Concluding, the article argues PSI is a poor model to address malicious software, but that there are two substantive goals that may see more success: creating legal protections for cybersecurity research; and limiting the supply of software vulnerabilities available to attackers. Highlighting these differences between the approaches of Wassenaar and the PSI, this article presents cybersecurity as an interdependent ecosystem of people and ideas suitable for examination rather than being inaccessible or a purely technical space |
Money, Jeannette; Lockhart, Sarah P The Paucity of International Protections: Global Migration Governance in the Contemporary Era Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (1), pp. 45-67, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Money2017, title = {The Paucity of International Protections: Global Migration Governance in the Contemporary Era }, author = { Jeannette Money and Sarah P Lockhart}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.1.3.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy007}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {45-67}, abstract = {The September 2016 UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was welcomed with much enthusiasm, as the 193 UN Member States agreed to meet yet again to negotiate a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. In the year that followed, the process of consultations and negotiations laid out in Annex II of the Declaration moved ahead at full steam (IOM 2017). What will be the substantive outcome of this process? To answer this question, we provide a theoretical framework to explain the structure of international cooperation on migration. The structure consists of five elements: the patterns of migration flows in the post-World War II period, which divide states into countries of origin and countries of destination; the status quo of customary international law that privileges countries of destination; exogenous shocks that trigger changes in the costs of the status quo; the institutionalization of the international system that permits countries of origin to project their preferences onto the international stage; and finally, the ability of countries of destination to ignore these preferences. Examples illustrate the application of the theoretical model. Will the Global Compact provide more and better interstate cooperation on migration? Or, will states largely ignore it, as they have ignored the three previous multilateral migration treaties? We argue that, unfortunately, the structure of international cooperation on migration, as just described, leads to the conclusion that this Declaration is likely to be ignored. Given the limited possibility of international cooperation, we recommend that mobilization for migrant rights should focus on the national and local levels. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The September 2016 UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was welcomed with much enthusiasm, as the 193 UN Member States agreed to meet yet again to negotiate a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. In the year that followed, the process of consultations and negotiations laid out in Annex II of the Declaration moved ahead at full steam (IOM 2017). What will be the substantive outcome of this process? To answer this question, we provide a theoretical framework to explain the structure of international cooperation on migration. The structure consists of five elements: the patterns of migration flows in the post-World War II period, which divide states into countries of origin and countries of destination; the status quo of customary international law that privileges countries of destination; exogenous shocks that trigger changes in the costs of the status quo; the institutionalization of the international system that permits countries of origin to project their preferences onto the international stage; and finally, the ability of countries of destination to ignore these preferences. Examples illustrate the application of the theoretical model. Will the Global Compact provide more and better interstate cooperation on migration? Or, will states largely ignore it, as they have ignored the three previous multilateral migration treaties? We argue that, unfortunately, the structure of international cooperation on migration, as just described, leads to the conclusion that this Declaration is likely to be ignored. Given the limited possibility of international cooperation, we recommend that mobilization for migrant rights should focus on the national and local levels. |
Lopes, Dawisson Belém; Oliveira, João Paulo Ferraz Global Summitry, 3 (1), pp. 68-85, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Lopes2017, title = {Latin American Secretaries-General of International Organizations: A Typical Case of “Diplomacy of Prestige” or Just Another Side Effect of Growing Cosmopolitanism? }, author = { Dawisson Belém Lopes and João Paulo Ferraz Oliveira}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.1.4.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy004}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {68-85}, abstract = {The article discusses the hypothesis of there being a “diplomacy of prestige” in Latin America, i.e., if states from the region have consistently used formal leadership positions at international organizations as a means to pursue national interests. A second hypothesis posits that Latin American secretaries-general (SGs) are rather a collateral effect of transnational cosmopolitanism than a deliberate prestige-seeking strategy. This research comprises two stages: an assessment on data about eighty-six Latin American SGs from 1948 to 2015, condensing their personal and professional trajectories, and a prosopographical approach to ten case studies as a way of observing their relationship with the respective countries of origin. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The article discusses the hypothesis of there being a “diplomacy of prestige” in Latin America, i.e., if states from the region have consistently used formal leadership positions at international organizations as a means to pursue national interests. A second hypothesis posits that Latin American secretaries-general (SGs) are rather a collateral effect of transnational cosmopolitanism than a deliberate prestige-seeking strategy. This research comprises two stages: an assessment on data about eighty-six Latin American SGs from 1948 to 2015, condensing their personal and professional trajectories, and a prosopographical approach to ten case studies as a way of observing their relationship with the respective countries of origin. |
Alexandroff, Alan S; Brean, Donald J S GS Editor's Note Miscellaneous 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Editor's Note). @misc{Alexandroff2017, title = {GS Editor's Note}, author = {Alan S. Alexandroff and Donald J.S. Brean}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.2.1.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy012}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, abstract = {EXTRACT: With Issue 3(2) we present our first Special Issue (SI) for Global Summitry (GS). It is reflective of the Journal’s focus that our first SI directly targets global summitry, and in this instance, the German G20 Summit in Hamburg. With the help of our colleagues at the German Development Institute (DIE), especially Julia Leininger and Axel Berger, but also the then Director of DIE, Dirk Messner, and also the President of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Dennis Snower, we were able to examine many of the policy initiatives that occurred during the German hosting of this G20. We also explored the changes wrought in the G20 agenda and policy outcomes with the appearance of the Trump Administration.}, note = {Editor's Note}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {misc} } EXTRACT: With Issue 3(2) we present our first Special Issue (SI) for Global Summitry (GS). It is reflective of the Journal’s focus that our first SI directly targets global summitry, and in this instance, the German G20 Summit in Hamburg. With the help of our colleagues at the German Development Institute (DIE), especially Julia Leininger and Axel Berger, but also the then Director of DIE, Dirk Messner, and also the President of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Dennis Snower, we were able to examine many of the policy initiatives that occurred during the German hosting of this G20. We also explored the changes wrought in the G20 agenda and policy outcomes with the appearance of the Trump Administration. |
Berger, Axel; Leininger, Julia; Messner, Dirk The G20 in 2017: Born in a Financial Crisis—Lost in a Global Crisis? Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (2), pp. 110-123, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Berger2017, title = {The G20 in 2017: Born in a Financial Crisis—Lost in a Global Crisis?}, author = {Axel Berger and Julia Leininger and Dirk Messner}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.2.2.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy011}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {110-123}, abstract = {This introduction to the Special Issue, what we have named “The G20 in 2017: Born in a Financial Crisis—Lost in a Global Crisis?,” provides an overview of the achievements of the German G20 presidency (from December 2016 to November 2017) and puts it in the context of an increasingly contested global environment. It includes an assessment of the areas in which the German presidency has successfully carried through its initial priorities and the extent to which the G20 in 2017 has contributed to improved multilateral cooperation. This assessment is based on the contributions to the Special Issue and includes an overview of their main results in key policy areas, such as climate, taxation, trade, sustainable development, and cooperation with Africa. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This introduction to the Special Issue, what we have named “The G20 in 2017: Born in a Financial Crisis—Lost in a Global Crisis?,” provides an overview of the achievements of the German G20 presidency (from December 2016 to November 2017) and puts it in the context of an increasingly contested global environment. It includes an assessment of the areas in which the German presidency has successfully carried through its initial priorities and the extent to which the G20 in 2017 has contributed to improved multilateral cooperation. This assessment is based on the contributions to the Special Issue and includes an overview of their main results in key policy areas, such as climate, taxation, trade, sustainable development, and cooperation with Africa. |
Berger, Axel; Evenett, Simon J The Trump-Induced G20 Stress Test on Trade: Did the German Presidency Pass? Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (2), pp. 124-140, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Berger2017b, title = {The Trump-Induced G20 Stress Test on Trade: Did the German Presidency Pass? }, author = {Axel Berger and Simon J Evenett}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.2.3.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy002}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {124-140}, abstract = {At the beginning of its G20 year, the German Presidency attached little priority to trade policy. That stance had to change with the ascension to the office of a U.S. President unwilling to follow the diplomatic niceties on the trade policy of his predecessors. Moreover, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the first quarter of 2017, the fear grew that election-era protectionist slogans might be converted into action by the United States. This article assesses how effectively the German Presidency and the G20 process, in general, managed the Trump-induced “stress test” on trade policy. The non-binding form of international economic cooperation, evident with the Leaders’ Summit appears, in our opinion, to have been only partially successful. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } At the beginning of its G20 year, the German Presidency attached little priority to trade policy. That stance had to change with the ascension to the office of a U.S. President unwilling to follow the diplomatic niceties on the trade policy of his predecessors. Moreover, following the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in the first quarter of 2017, the fear grew that election-era protectionist slogans might be converted into action by the United States. This article assesses how effectively the German Presidency and the G20 process, in general, managed the Trump-induced “stress test” on trade policy. The non-binding form of international economic cooperation, evident with the Leaders’ Summit appears, in our opinion, to have been only partially successful. |
von Haldenwang, Christian; Schwab, Jakob Pathways to International Tax Governance: Has the German G20 Presidency Made a Difference? Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (2), pp. 141-155, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{vonHaldenwang2017, title = {Pathways to International Tax Governance: Has the German G20 Presidency Made a Difference?}, author = {Christian von Haldenwang and Jakob Schwab}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.2.4.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy006}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {141-155}, abstract = {The article provides an overview of recent developments in the field of global tax cooperation, with a specific focus on the activities of the G20 under the German presidency. It argues that Germany has mostly limited itself to following-up on previous initiatives, rather than presenting new initiatives concerning the international tax governance structure. Progress has been achieved with regard to fighting tax avoidance by multinational corporations and exchanging information between tax authorities. However, these changes are insufficient to address spillovers arising from mismatches between public finance and public service delivery. Developing countries in particular are challenged to manage such spillovers under the current international tax system.}, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The article provides an overview of recent developments in the field of global tax cooperation, with a specific focus on the activities of the G20 under the German presidency. It argues that Germany has mostly limited itself to following-up on previous initiatives, rather than presenting new initiatives concerning the international tax governance structure. Progress has been achieved with regard to fighting tax avoidance by multinational corporations and exchanging information between tax authorities. However, these changes are insufficient to address spillovers arising from mismatches between public finance and public service delivery. Developing countries in particular are challenged to manage such spillovers under the current international tax system. |
Scholz, Imme; Brandi, Clara Implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Achievements and Limitations of the G20 Presidency in 2017 Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (2), pp. 156-175, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Scholz2017, title = {Implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Achievements and Limitations of the G20 Presidency in 2017 }, author = { Imme Scholz and Clara Brandi}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.2.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy003 }, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {156-175}, abstract = {One major objective of the German G20 presidency in 2016/17 was to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are essential to addressing the collective challenges faced by the world. Without G20 countries, these challenges cannot be tackled effectively. Putting the spotlight on the 2030 Agenda in the G20 can generate peer pressure among the world’s major economies, initiate fruitful learning processes and contribute to keeping the momentum for transformative change, and achieving the SDGs as well as promoting policy coherence for sustainable development. It is, therefore, commendable that the G20 members, with the adoption of their Action Plan during the Chinese G20 Presidency, are committed to the 2030 Agenda. In this article, we analyze to what extent the German G20 Presidency, building on the achievements of the 2016 Hangzhou Summit, has been successful in leveraging the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and in which ways the G20 was able to make a difference for enhanced global cooperation. The assessment of the German G20 presidency shows that the outcome of the 2017 Hamburg Summit can hardly be considered as a great breakthrough for sustainable development. Yet the Summit does offer opportunities for real progress to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda if further action is taken by the Member States and the follow-up G20 presidencies on the Hamburg commitments.}, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } One major objective of the German G20 presidency in 2016/17 was to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are essential to addressing the collective challenges faced by the world. Without G20 countries, these challenges cannot be tackled effectively. Putting the spotlight on the 2030 Agenda in the G20 can generate peer pressure among the world’s major economies, initiate fruitful learning processes and contribute to keeping the momentum for transformative change, and achieving the SDGs as well as promoting policy coherence for sustainable development. It is, therefore, commendable that the G20 members, with the adoption of their Action Plan during the Chinese G20 Presidency, are committed to the 2030 Agenda. In this article, we analyze to what extent the German G20 Presidency, building on the achievements of the 2016 Hangzhou Summit, has been successful in leveraging the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and in which ways the G20 was able to make a difference for enhanced global cooperation. The assessment of the German G20 presidency shows that the outcome of the 2017 Hamburg Summit can hardly be considered as a great breakthrough for sustainable development. Yet the Summit does offer opportunities for real progress to promote the implementation of the 2030 Agenda if further action is taken by the Member States and the follow-up G20 presidencies on the Hamburg commitments. |
Bak, Céline Do G20 Leaders need to put on their Own Emergency Oxygen Masks First? A Look at Germany’s G20 Presidency and Climate Policy Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (2), pp. 176-192, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Bak2017, title = {Do G20 Leaders need to put on their Own Emergency Oxygen Masks First? A Look at Germany’s G20 Presidency and Climate Policy }, author = {Céline Bak}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.2.6.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy001}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {176-192}, abstract = {This article examines climate policy commitments under the German G20 presidency. It concludes that the fracturing of the G20 consensus on climate change resulted in two course changes—one positive and one negative. A ‘near-consensus’ was expressed in the Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth (CEAG). There the G19 maintained climate commitments, including a recognition of the role of sustainable infrastructure for inclusive low-carbon growth. On the negative side of the ledger, the absence of an ongoing mandate for the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to address the impact of climate change on the global financial system is cause for grave concern. To guard against a further fracturing of the consensus needed for structural reforms—such as carbon pricing—G19 leaders and finance ministers must engage citizens, particularly young citizens, on how best to integrate economic, social, and climate policy. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article examines climate policy commitments under the German G20 presidency. It concludes that the fracturing of the G20 consensus on climate change resulted in two course changes—one positive and one negative. A ‘near-consensus’ was expressed in the Hamburg Climate and Energy Action Plan for Growth (CEAG). There the G19 maintained climate commitments, including a recognition of the role of sustainable infrastructure for inclusive low-carbon growth. On the negative side of the ledger, the absence of an ongoing mandate for the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to address the impact of climate change on the global financial system is cause for grave concern. To guard against a further fracturing of the consensus needed for structural reforms—such as carbon pricing—G19 leaders and finance ministers must engage citizens, particularly young citizens, on how best to integrate economic, social, and climate policy. |
Leininger, Julia “On the Table or at the Table?” G20 and its Cooperation with Africa Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (2), pp. 193-205, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Leininger2017, title = {“On the Table or at the Table?” G20 and its Cooperation with Africa }, author = {Julia Leininger}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.2.7.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy010}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {193-205}, abstract = {This article contains an analysis of the cooperation with African governments during the German presidency of the G20 in 2017. The author argues that the G20’s exclusive approach to global rule-making for the world economy contradicts the G20’s aim to support domestic economic development in Africa. The empirical analysis provides a systematic assessment of G20 policies in 2017, in particular the Compact with Africa (CWA). An assessment of the procedural outcomes, such as the representation of African governments and institutions, is also given in the article. The empirical analysis is based on insights from the Think 20 process, an official engagement process of the G20. The article concludes that it was innovative to prioritize cooperation with African governments on the G20 agenda and to recognize the importance of African ownership. Although policy implementation of this initiative began right after the G20 Summit in July 2017, especially of the CWA, no deeper engagement of African actors in the G20 process was achieved. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article contains an analysis of the cooperation with African governments during the German presidency of the G20 in 2017. The author argues that the G20’s exclusive approach to global rule-making for the world economy contradicts the G20’s aim to support domestic economic development in Africa. The empirical analysis provides a systematic assessment of G20 policies in 2017, in particular the Compact with Africa (CWA). An assessment of the procedural outcomes, such as the representation of African governments and institutions, is also given in the article. The empirical analysis is based on insights from the Think 20 process, an official engagement process of the G20. The article concludes that it was innovative to prioritize cooperation with African governments on the G20 agenda and to recognize the importance of African ownership. Although policy implementation of this initiative began right after the G20 Summit in July 2017, especially of the CWA, no deeper engagement of African actors in the G20 process was achieved. |
Messner, Dirk; Snower, Dennis The G20 Summit Was More Successful than You Think Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (2), pp. 206-211, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Messner2017, title = {The G20 Summit Was More Successful than You Think }, author = {Dirk Messner and Dennis Snower}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.2.8.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy009}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {206-211}, abstract = {We argue that the different results of the G20 Summit in Hamburg show what can be achieved under an insightful, competent, and globally-minded G20 Presidency, combined with a disciplined advisory process, drawing on the expertise of leading G20 think tanks and other research organizations—even in times of turbulent global governance and uneasy multilateralism. An effective global order needs to be built not only on intergovernmental cooperation, but also on dense and growing networks and alliances between G20 societies, which might help to contribute developing joint interests and narratives on global governance in an economically, technologically, ecologically highly integrated, but socially and politically still very fragmented word. The T20 might play a substantial role in those regards. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } We argue that the different results of the G20 Summit in Hamburg show what can be achieved under an insightful, competent, and globally-minded G20 Presidency, combined with a disciplined advisory process, drawing on the expertise of leading G20 think tanks and other research organizations—even in times of turbulent global governance and uneasy multilateralism. An effective global order needs to be built not only on intergovernmental cooperation, but also on dense and growing networks and alliances between G20 societies, which might help to contribute developing joint interests and narratives on global governance in an economically, technologically, ecologically highly integrated, but socially and politically still very fragmented word. The T20 might play a substantial role in those regards. |
2016 |
Fravel, Taylor M Explaining China’s Escalation over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 24-37, 2016, (Flashpoints). @article{Fravel2016, title = {Explaining China’s Escalation over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands }, author = {M. Taylor Fravel}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.4.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw010}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-08-12}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {24-37}, abstract = {This article examines China’s behaviour in the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Before 2010, China adopted a low-key approach to the dispute. After 2010, however, China chose to escalate the dispute, first in response to Japan’s detention of a Chinese fishing vessel in September 2010 and then in response to the Japanese government’s purchase of three of the islands in September 2012. China escalated because Japan’s actions challenged China’s relatively weak position in the dispute. By escalating, China could counter Japanese actions and strengthen its position in the dispute. Since late 2013, the dispute appears to have stabilized. China’s patrols within twelve nautical miles of the islands have strengthened China’s position in the dispute, while Japan has refrained from developing the islands. }, note = {Flashpoints}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article examines China’s behaviour in the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Before 2010, China adopted a low-key approach to the dispute. After 2010, however, China chose to escalate the dispute, first in response to Japan’s detention of a Chinese fishing vessel in September 2010 and then in response to the Japanese government’s purchase of three of the islands in September 2012. China escalated because Japan’s actions challenged China’s relatively weak position in the dispute. By escalating, China could counter Japanese actions and strengthen its position in the dispute. Since late 2013, the dispute appears to have stabilized. China’s patrols within twelve nautical miles of the islands have strengthened China’s position in the dispute, while Japan has refrained from developing the islands. |
Farrell, Henry Globalized Green Lanternism Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 13-21, 2016, (Article). @article{Farrell2016, title = {Globalized Green Lanternism}, author = {Henry Farrell}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.2.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw005}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-07-25}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {13-21}, abstract = {American political commentators have frequently called for the U.S. president to take effective action to improve world economic growth. Such calls are a form of what Matthew Yglesias has dubbed “Green Lanternism”—the unspoken theory that the U.S. president's ability to affect outcomes is primarily affected by his willpower. In this article, I examine the opposite—and more plausible causal relationship—that the power of the U.S. president is shaped by the underlying secular determinant of world economic growth. I go on to examine how we might expect U.S. power and interests in building up a multilateral trading order could largely wither away under conditions of enduring weak economic growth, which some economists have argued is in fact the most plausible long-run growth path for the world economy. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } American political commentators have frequently called for the U.S. president to take effective action to improve world economic growth. Such calls are a form of what Matthew Yglesias has dubbed “Green Lanternism”—the unspoken theory that the U.S. president's ability to affect outcomes is primarily affected by his willpower. In this article, I examine the opposite—and more plausible causal relationship—that the power of the U.S. president is shaped by the underlying secular determinant of world economic growth. I go on to examine how we might expect U.S. power and interests in building up a multilateral trading order could largely wither away under conditions of enduring weak economic growth, which some economists have argued is in fact the most plausible long-run growth path for the world economy. |
Jobbins, Mike; Ahitungiye, Floride Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Burundi’s 2015 Election Crisis Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 205-218, 2016, (Article). @article{Jobbins2016, title = {Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention in Burundi’s 2015 Election Crisis }, author = {Mike Jobbins and Floride Ahitungiye}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.2.6.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw003}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-04-12}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {205-218}, abstract = {On April 26, 2015, the small central African nation of Burundi was plunged into its most profound political crisis since the end of a civil war. During the crisis, more than 300,000 people died—often in intercommunal violence. The nomination of President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term in office led to sustained street demonstrations by opposition forces in the capital; an attempted coup d’état; and a cycle of insecurity, fear, human rights abuses, and targeted killings. This political crisis threatens to undermine one of the most notable successes in resolving seemingly intractable conflicts in Africa in recent years. The crisis also sheds light on the influence and limits of international cooperation. Building peace in Burundi during the conflict, supporting reconciliation and the consolidation of democracy, and addressing the dynamics of the current crises are the processes that the authors have seen firsthand over the past decade. We both work with Search for Common Ground, an international non-governmental organization that has worked to support societal conflict transformation in the country over the past twenty years. Floride acts as Burundi Country Director, and Mike is Director of Global Affairs. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } On April 26, 2015, the small central African nation of Burundi was plunged into its most profound political crisis since the end of a civil war. During the crisis, more than 300,000 people died—often in intercommunal violence. The nomination of President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term in office led to sustained street demonstrations by opposition forces in the capital; an attempted coup d’état; and a cycle of insecurity, fear, human rights abuses, and targeted killings. This political crisis threatens to undermine one of the most notable successes in resolving seemingly intractable conflicts in Africa in recent years. The crisis also sheds light on the influence and limits of international cooperation. Building peace in Burundi during the conflict, supporting reconciliation and the consolidation of democracy, and addressing the dynamics of the current crises are the processes that the authors have seen firsthand over the past decade. We both work with Search for Common Ground, an international non-governmental organization that has worked to support societal conflict transformation in the country over the past twenty years. Floride acts as Burundi Country Director, and Mike is Director of Global Affairs. |
Chin, Gregory T; Dobson, Hugo China’s Presidency of the G20 Hangzhou: On Global Leadership and Strategy Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 151-170, 2016, (Article). @article{Chin2016, title = {China’s Presidency of the G20 Hangzhou: On Global Leadership and Strategy}, author = {Gregory T. Chin and Hugo Dobson}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.2.3.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw002}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-03-26}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {151-170}, abstract = {China is the host presidency for the G20 Leaders Summit for the cycle-year of 2016. In assuming the G20 presidency, China is taking on this global leadership role at a historic juncture, when structural deficiencies in the world economy are re-emerging, and as the supporters of the G20 are pushing for this summitry platform to evolve from a crisis response mechanism to one of long-term, or at least mid-term, governance. This article outlines the key “how to” considerations that all G20 hosts must consider; details China's strategy and approach to agenda- and priority-setting; and examines how China's positioning in global governance, and global affairs more broadly, is evolving as a result. The main finding is that, as a result of taking on the G20 presidency, China is stepping up to some aspects of global leadership and elements of global collective responsibility that are specific to this unique global summit.}, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } China is the host presidency for the G20 Leaders Summit for the cycle-year of 2016. In assuming the G20 presidency, China is taking on this global leadership role at a historic juncture, when structural deficiencies in the world economy are re-emerging, and as the supporters of the G20 are pushing for this summitry platform to evolve from a crisis response mechanism to one of long-term, or at least mid-term, governance. This article outlines the key “how to” considerations that all G20 hosts must consider; details China's strategy and approach to agenda- and priority-setting; and examines how China's positioning in global governance, and global affairs more broadly, is evolving as a result. The main finding is that, as a result of taking on the G20 presidency, China is stepping up to some aspects of global leadership and elements of global collective responsibility that are specific to this unique global summit. |
Alden, Christopher; Schoeman, Maxi Reconstructing South African Identity through Global Summitry Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 187-204, 2016. @article{Alden2016, title = {Reconstructing South African Identity through Global Summitry }, author = {Christopher Alden and Maxi Schoeman}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.2.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw001}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-03-21}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {187-204}, abstract = {This article will evaluate South Africa’s pursuit of global summitry as an expression of its own evolving national identity. Since its inception, South Africa’s multiculturalism has produced fragmentation and reconstitution of identity-based sovereignty. We argue that the contradictions which have featured in the historical processes of South African identity formation and reformation, whether from its position as a colonial bastion of white power or that of a beacon of African liberation, are both motivated by, and manifested through, its foreign policy activism in global summitry. This process lends meaning to contested domestic politics and helps shape regional and global affinities, affirming South Africa’s legitimacy as a representative of the African continent. Engaging in global summitry provides South Africa an opportunity to present a coherent purpose to audiences at home and abroad on key issues that emerge out of the country’s divided diversity. }, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article will evaluate South Africa’s pursuit of global summitry as an expression of its own evolving national identity. Since its inception, South Africa’s multiculturalism has produced fragmentation and reconstitution of identity-based sovereignty. We argue that the contradictions which have featured in the historical processes of South African identity formation and reformation, whether from its position as a colonial bastion of white power or that of a beacon of African liberation, are both motivated by, and manifested through, its foreign policy activism in global summitry. This process lends meaning to contested domestic politics and helps shape regional and global affinities, affirming South Africa’s legitimacy as a representative of the African continent. Engaging in global summitry provides South Africa an opportunity to present a coherent purpose to audiences at home and abroad on key issues that emerge out of the country’s divided diversity. |
Slaughter, Steven Building G20 Outreach: The Role of Transnational Policy Networks in Sustaining Effective and Legitimate Summitry Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 171–186, 2016, (Article). @article{Slaughter2016, title = {Building G20 Outreach: The Role of Transnational Policy Networks in Sustaining Effective and Legitimate Summitry}, author = {Steven Slaughter}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.2.4.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv009}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-25}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = { 171–186}, abstract = {G20 outreach processes, in the form of the Think 20, Labour 20, Business 20, and Civil 20, Youth 20, and Women 20, are a formal attempt by G20 leaders to engage various social sectors with G20 policymaking. This essay contends that G20 outreach processes are best understood as transnational policy networks, which are involved in widening the field of policy communication and deliberation. The importance of these transnational policy networks rests upon their role in developing and disseminating G20 policy priorities and principles and are an attempt to enhance the legitimacy and influence of the G20 and its policy proposals. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } G20 outreach processes, in the form of the Think 20, Labour 20, Business 20, and Civil 20, Youth 20, and Women 20, are a formal attempt by G20 leaders to engage various social sectors with G20 policymaking. This essay contends that G20 outreach processes are best understood as transnational policy networks, which are involved in widening the field of policy communication and deliberation. The importance of these transnational policy networks rests upon their role in developing and disseminating G20 policy priorities and principles and are an attempt to enhance the legitimacy and influence of the G20 and its policy proposals. |
Bradlow, Daniel D Lessons from the Frontlines: What I Learned from My Participation in the G20 Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 135-150, 2016, (Summit Dialogue #1). @article{Bradlow2016, title = {Lessons from the Frontlines: What I Learned from My Participation in the G20}, author = {Daniel D. Bradlow}, url = {https://academic.oup.com/globalsummitry/article-pdf/1/2/135/6988599/guv007.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv007}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-21}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {135-150}, abstract = {It is a rare privilege for an academic who has specialized in international economic institutions to get a chance to put what he researched into practice. I had this privilege when I became the first head of the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) new International Economic Relations and Policy Department. In this capacity, I represented the SARB in G20 and BRICS meetings during my approximately two years with the Bank, which concluded at the end of October 2014. My department was responsible for coordinating the SARB’s relations with the IMF. This article is my first attempt to reflect on the lessons I learned about the G20 and its relations with the countries and entities that participate in its meetings. It is divided into four sections. First, I will give a brief overview of the G20 process in order to put my experience and the lessons I learned into context. Second, I will discuss seven lessons I learned about global economic governance from the experience. Third, I will make three general observations about the G20 process. The final section is a conclusion. Two caveats are in order. First, this article contains my personal reflections on the G20 and all the opinions expressed in the article are my own. Nothing that is stated in the article should be attributed to the SARB or the South African Government. Second, central banks participate in all the meetings of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors leading up to the G20 Summit, but they do not participate in the G20 Summit itself or in the meetings of the G20 Sherpa track. My reflections and opinions, therefore, are based only on my experience as a participant in the G20 Finance track meetings.}, note = {Summit Dialogue #1}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } It is a rare privilege for an academic who has specialized in international economic institutions to get a chance to put what he researched into practice. I had this privilege when I became the first head of the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) new International Economic Relations and Policy Department. In this capacity, I represented the SARB in G20 and BRICS meetings during my approximately two years with the Bank, which concluded at the end of October 2014. My department was responsible for coordinating the SARB’s relations with the IMF. This article is my first attempt to reflect on the lessons I learned about the G20 and its relations with the countries and entities that participate in its meetings. It is divided into four sections. First, I will give a brief overview of the G20 process in order to put my experience and the lessons I learned into context. Second, I will discuss seven lessons I learned about global economic governance from the experience. Third, I will make three general observations about the G20 process. The final section is a conclusion. Two caveats are in order. First, this article contains my personal reflections on the G20 and all the opinions expressed in the article are my own. Nothing that is stated in the article should be attributed to the SARB or the South African Government. Second, central banks participate in all the meetings of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors leading up to the G20 Summit, but they do not participate in the G20 Summit itself or in the meetings of the G20 Sherpa track. My reflections and opinions, therefore, are based only on my experience as a participant in the G20 Finance track meetings. |
Helleiner, Eric Legacies of the 2008 Crisis for Global Financial Governance Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 1-12, 2016, (Feature Article). @article{Helleiner2016, title = {Legacies of the 2008 Crisis for Global Financial Governance}, author = {Eric Helleiner}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.1.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw006}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {1-12}, abstract = {What are the legacies of the 2008 financial crisis for global financial governance? One answer is that the crisis strengthened the cooperative and multilateral dimensions of international financial relations. A different interpretation is that the crisis unleashed decentralization trends. Important examples can be cited in support of both of these perspectives. After reviewing that evidence, this article highlights ways in which these two distinct legacies are working together to generate a third outcome that may well emerge as the more lasting legacy of the crisis: cooperative decentralization in global financial governance. }, note = {Feature Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } What are the legacies of the 2008 financial crisis for global financial governance? One answer is that the crisis strengthened the cooperative and multilateral dimensions of international financial relations. A different interpretation is that the crisis unleashed decentralization trends. Important examples can be cited in support of both of these perspectives. After reviewing that evidence, this article highlights ways in which these two distinct legacies are working together to generate a third outcome that may well emerge as the more lasting legacy of the crisis: cooperative decentralization in global financial governance. |
Martin, Paul Paul Martin on the G20 and China’s Hosting of the G20 Leaders’ Summit Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 22-23, 2016, (Summit Dialogue). @article{Martin2016, title = {Paul Martin on the G20 and China’s Hosting of the G20 Leaders’ Summit}, author = {Paul Martin}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.3.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw009}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {22-23}, abstract = {Editor’s note: This is the text of the video remarks by Paul Martin, to the V20 meeting in Hangzhou China. Paul Martin was the Prime Minister of Canada from 2003 to 2006 and the Minister of Finance from 1993 to 2002. Mr. Martin was the inaugural chair of the Finance Ministers’ G20. The embedded podcast in these remarks is an interview by Alan Alexandroff, one of the Senior Editors of Global Summitry. It was recorded on May 4, 2016. Mr. Martin was one of the earliest proponents of a leaders’ level summit for the G20. Mr. Martin is also a member of the Global Advisory Board for this Journal. The Vision 20 meeting in China (March 29 to April 1) and the network is to bring together scholars from various fields with think tank leaders, civil society and private sector leaders, and government leaders with the hope of generating ideas and actionable items for the long and medium-term while finding ways to initiate such processes in the short term.}, note = {Summit Dialogue}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Editor’s note: This is the text of the video remarks by Paul Martin, to the V20 meeting in Hangzhou China. Paul Martin was the Prime Minister of Canada from 2003 to 2006 and the Minister of Finance from 1993 to 2002. Mr. Martin was the inaugural chair of the Finance Ministers’ G20. The embedded podcast in these remarks is an interview by Alan Alexandroff, one of the Senior Editors of Global Summitry. It was recorded on May 4, 2016. Mr. Martin was one of the earliest proponents of a leaders’ level summit for the G20. Mr. Martin is also a member of the Global Advisory Board for this Journal. The Vision 20 meeting in China (March 29 to April 1) and the network is to bring together scholars from various fields with think tank leaders, civil society and private sector leaders, and government leaders with the hope of generating ideas and actionable items for the long and medium-term while finding ways to initiate such processes in the short term. |
Stuenkel, Oliver The BRICS: Seeking Privileges by Constructing and Running Multilateral Institutions Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 38-53, 2016, (Article). @article{Stuenkel2016, title = {The BRICS: Seeking Privileges by Constructing and Running Multilateral Institutions }, author = {Oliver Stuenkel}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw008}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {38-53}, abstract = {How should we think of the decisions made by China and the other BRICS countries to establish a series of new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB)? Does such activism show that rising powers are embracing or confronting today’s Western-led order? This article argues that rather than analyzing emerging powers’ beliefs about rules and norms, these new institutions can best be understood as a tool to enhance their capacity to gain privileges of leadership, and slowly reduce the United States’ institutional centrality which provides it with a hegemonic privilege. Such privilege is seen to allow states to break the rules without asking for a “permission slip” and without fearing institutional punishment. The proliferation of non-Western institutions would appear to complement existing ones and allow rising powers to engage in forum shopping on a trans-regional level. Such forum shopping for the BRICS would seem to provide advantages, including reducing their dependence on Western-led institutions when they are perceived by the BRICS and others to serve the interests of established powers. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } How should we think of the decisions made by China and the other BRICS countries to establish a series of new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB)? Does such activism show that rising powers are embracing or confronting today’s Western-led order? This article argues that rather than analyzing emerging powers’ beliefs about rules and norms, these new institutions can best be understood as a tool to enhance their capacity to gain privileges of leadership, and slowly reduce the United States’ institutional centrality which provides it with a hegemonic privilege. Such privilege is seen to allow states to break the rules without asking for a “permission slip” and without fearing institutional punishment. The proliferation of non-Western institutions would appear to complement existing ones and allow rising powers to engage in forum shopping on a trans-regional level. Such forum shopping for the BRICS would seem to provide advantages, including reducing their dependence on Western-led institutions when they are perceived by the BRICS and others to serve the interests of established powers. |
Beeson, Mark Multilateralism in East Asia: Less than the Sum of Its Parts? Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 54-70, 2016, (Article). @article{Beeson2016, title = {Multilateralism in East Asia: Less than the Sum of Its Parts?}, author = {Mark Beeson}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.6.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw007}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {54-70}, abstract = {The East Asian region is famous for many things, among the more surprising of which is the relatively ineffective nature of its multilateral institutions. Although many scholars claim that organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been effective parts of regional diplomacy, this article suggests that the so-called ASEAN Way has provided a template for regional underachievement and ineffectiveness. As a consequence, and despite a recent flurry of regional initiatives, none of them has been anything like as significant or effective as the European Union was at the height of its powers. This is the unsurprising consequence of institutional design and the politics of the lowest common denominator. The rise of China is unlikely to change this. On contrary, not only has ASEAN solidarity fractured in the face of an increasingly assertive China, but China’s own instrumental attitude to institutional development means that under-performance is likely to remain the regional norm as an array of ineffective institutions compete for authority and relevance. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The East Asian region is famous for many things, among the more surprising of which is the relatively ineffective nature of its multilateral institutions. Although many scholars claim that organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been effective parts of regional diplomacy, this article suggests that the so-called ASEAN Way has provided a template for regional underachievement and ineffectiveness. As a consequence, and despite a recent flurry of regional initiatives, none of them has been anything like as significant or effective as the European Union was at the height of its powers. This is the unsurprising consequence of institutional design and the politics of the lowest common denominator. The rise of China is unlikely to change this. On contrary, not only has ASEAN solidarity fractured in the face of an increasingly assertive China, but China’s own instrumental attitude to institutional development means that under-performance is likely to remain the regional norm as an array of ineffective institutions compete for authority and relevance. |
Druckman, Daniel; Wallensteen, Peter Summit Meetings: Good or Bad for Peace? Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (2), pp. 71-92, 2016, (Feature Article). @article{Druckman2016, title = {Summit Meetings: Good or Bad for Peace?}, author = {Daniel Druckman and Peter Wallensteen}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.2.1.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/gux001}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {71-92}, abstract = {The systematic study of summit diplomacy, its role in international relations, and its contribution to world peace is remarkably scant. The research presented here is a step forward in understanding the significance of direct, personal, face-to-face meetings between top leaders in dominant states. Such summits continue to generate a lot of attention, often preceded with high expectations and leaving in disappointment. This article will present a unique dataset of summit meetings between the United States and its main competitor for global influence, the Soviet Union and modern Russia. We begin with the first meeting ever between Roosevelt and Stalin in 1943 in Tehran, Iran and end with a 2014 meeting between Obama and Putin in Brisbane, Australia. The data are used to evaluate several hypotheses about relationships between summit meetings and armed conflict. Our findings suggest that the summit meetings have been motivated by conflicts but do not contribute to their management. Wars involving Russia also account for the relationship between summit frequency and international cooperation. These results raise questions about the conflict-managing functions of summit meetings. }, note = {Feature Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The systematic study of summit diplomacy, its role in international relations, and its contribution to world peace is remarkably scant. The research presented here is a step forward in understanding the significance of direct, personal, face-to-face meetings between top leaders in dominant states. Such summits continue to generate a lot of attention, often preceded with high expectations and leaving in disappointment. This article will present a unique dataset of summit meetings between the United States and its main competitor for global influence, the Soviet Union and modern Russia. We begin with the first meeting ever between Roosevelt and Stalin in 1943 in Tehran, Iran and end with a 2014 meeting between Obama and Putin in Brisbane, Australia. The data are used to evaluate several hypotheses about relationships between summit meetings and armed conflict. Our findings suggest that the summit meetings have been motivated by conflicts but do not contribute to their management. Wars involving Russia also account for the relationship between summit frequency and international cooperation. These results raise questions about the conflict-managing functions of summit meetings. |
Tobey, William Peering down from the Summit: The Path to Nuclear Security 2010–2016 and beyond Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (2), pp. 93-113, 2016, (Policy Watch). @article{Tobey2016, title = {Peering down from the Summit: The Path to Nuclear Security 2010–2016 and beyond }, author = {William Tobey}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.2.2.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw011}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {93-113}, abstract = {This article reviews the motivations, strengths, and weaknesses of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), both procedurally and substantively. Nearly fifty world leaders met at the various NSS—2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The circumstances that provoked these meetings were unusual, if not unique, but innovations undertaken at the meetings in global summitry and global governance will likely endure. The meetings advanced nuclear security in important ways, but the nuclear security problem cannot be resolved. It will require ultimately a commitment by states, international organizations, and nonstate actors to continuous improvement. It may ultimately require leaders to return to the summit. }, note = {Policy Watch}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article reviews the motivations, strengths, and weaknesses of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), both procedurally and substantively. Nearly fifty world leaders met at the various NSS—2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The circumstances that provoked these meetings were unusual, if not unique, but innovations undertaken at the meetings in global summitry and global governance will likely endure. The meetings advanced nuclear security in important ways, but the nuclear security problem cannot be resolved. It will require ultimately a commitment by states, international organizations, and nonstate actors to continuous improvement. It may ultimately require leaders to return to the summit. |
Kobrak, Christopher Interwar Financial Summits: The Economic Consequences and Lessons of Attempts to Repair a Broken World Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (2), pp. 114-142, 2016, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Kobrak2016, title = {Interwar Financial Summits: The Economic Consequences and Lessons of Attempts to Repair a Broken World }, author = { Christopher Kobrak}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.2.3.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/gux002}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {114-142}, abstract = {EXTRACT: Political summits with economic and financial consequences have a long history. Reparation payments accompanied Napoleon’s peace agreement with Prussia in 1807 and Prussia’s peace agreement with France in 1871. The Vienna Conference following Napoleon’s defeat was not about finance principally, but it not only stipulated reparations for the victors, its framework for international stability also helped set the stage for nearly 100 years of economic development supported by the growth of new financial institutions and nearly unprecedented financial cohesion. As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed, these financial settlements provided a model for future ones by not posing a mortal threat to any nation’s survival, thereby preserving a basis for future negotiation and consensus (Kissinger 1956).}, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } EXTRACT: Political summits with economic and financial consequences have a long history. Reparation payments accompanied Napoleon’s peace agreement with Prussia in 1807 and Prussia’s peace agreement with France in 1871. The Vienna Conference following Napoleon’s defeat was not about finance principally, but it not only stipulated reparations for the victors, its framework for international stability also helped set the stage for nearly 100 years of economic development supported by the growth of new financial institutions and nearly unprecedented financial cohesion. As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed, these financial settlements provided a model for future ones by not posing a mortal threat to any nation’s survival, thereby preserving a basis for future negotiation and consensus (Kissinger 1956). |
Colakoglu, Selcuk; Hecan, Mehmet Turkey in Global Governance: An Evaluation of Turkey’s G20 Presidency and the Antalya Summit 2015 Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (2), pp. 143-160, 2016, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Colakoglu2016, title = {Turkey in Global Governance: An Evaluation of Turkey’s G20 Presidency and the Antalya Summit 2015 }, author = {Selcuk Colakoglu and Mehmet Hecan}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.2.4.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/gux003}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {143-160}, abstract = {This article assesses Turkey’s G20 Presidency. In addition to reviewing the outputs of Turkey’s Presidency, it illustrates the importance and relevance of these outputs for the G20, as a whole. The article also provides an evaluation of certain dynamics and shortcomings which conditioned aspects of Turkey’s performance during its hosting of the G20 Presidency. This article also aims to give a brief illustration of both global governance and the G20, and Turkey’s position at their intersection, considering that contextualization of Turkey in global governance is a subfield demanding further study. Finally, the analysis reveals important findings and inferences with respect to unestablished middle powers and their contribution to global governance }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article assesses Turkey’s G20 Presidency. In addition to reviewing the outputs of Turkey’s Presidency, it illustrates the importance and relevance of these outputs for the G20, as a whole. The article also provides an evaluation of certain dynamics and shortcomings which conditioned aspects of Turkey’s performance during its hosting of the G20 Presidency. This article also aims to give a brief illustration of both global governance and the G20, and Turkey’s position at their intersection, considering that contextualization of Turkey in global governance is a subfield demanding further study. Finally, the analysis reveals important findings and inferences with respect to unestablished middle powers and their contribution to global governance |
Luckhurst, Jonathan The G20’s Growing Political and Economic Challenges Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (2), pp. 161–179, 2016, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Luckhurst2016, title = {The G20’s Growing Political and Economic Challenges }, author = {Jonathan Luckhurst }, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.2.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/gux004}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {161–179}, abstract = {The Group of Twenty (G20) confronts significant economic and political challenges, largely due to the failure to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth since the global financial crisis. This contributed to “populist” political trends that undermined the international economy in 2016, influencing the “Brexit” referendum and Donald Trump's U.S. election victory. The most ominous consequences of actions that may well echo the interwar period could be prevented today through international cooperation. Today’s political leaders need to build on efforts during the Chinese and German G20 presidencies to overcome the “new mediocre” in the global economy.}, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The Group of Twenty (G20) confronts significant economic and political challenges, largely due to the failure to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth since the global financial crisis. This contributed to “populist” political trends that undermined the international economy in 2016, influencing the “Brexit” referendum and Donald Trump's U.S. election victory. The most ominous consequences of actions that may well echo the interwar period could be prevented today through international cooperation. Today’s political leaders need to build on efforts during the Chinese and German G20 presidencies to overcome the “new mediocre” in the global economy. |
2015 |
Patrick, Stewart The New “New Multilateralism”: Minilateral Cooperation, but at What Cost? Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 115-134, 2015, (Feature Article). @article{Patrick2015, title = {The New “New Multilateralism”: Minilateral Cooperation, but at What Cost? }, author = {Stewart Patrick}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.2.1.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv008}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-12-18}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {115-134}, abstract = {A defining feature of twenty-first century multilateralism is growing reliance on informal, non-binding, purpose-built partnerships and coalitions of the interested, willing, and capable. The rise of minilateral cooperation reflects the failure of formal international organizations to adapt to complex global challenges, dramatic power shifts, and growing normative divergences in world politics. Such ad hoc, disaggregated approaches to international cooperation bring certain advantages, including speed, flexibility, modularity, and possibilities for experimentation. But the new multilateralism also presents dangers, among these encouraging rampant forum-shopping, undermining critical international organizations, and reducing accountability in global governance. }, note = {Feature Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } A defining feature of twenty-first century multilateralism is growing reliance on informal, non-binding, purpose-built partnerships and coalitions of the interested, willing, and capable. The rise of minilateral cooperation reflects the failure of formal international organizations to adapt to complex global challenges, dramatic power shifts, and growing normative divergences in world politics. Such ad hoc, disaggregated approaches to international cooperation bring certain advantages, including speed, flexibility, modularity, and possibilities for experimentation. But the new multilateralism also presents dangers, among these encouraging rampant forum-shopping, undermining critical international organizations, and reducing accountability in global governance. |
Cooper, Andrew F MIKTA and the Global Projection of Middle Powers: Toward a Summit of Their Own? Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (1), pp. 95-114, 2015, (article). @article{Cooper2015, title = {MIKTA and the Global Projection of Middle Powers: Toward a Summit of Their Own? }, author = {Andrew F. Cooper}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.1.6.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv005}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-07-28}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {95-114}, abstract = {Middle powers have long been excluded from global summits. The elevation of the G20 to the leaders’ level in the context of the 2008 financial crisis marks a significant turning point for Middle Power activity in global governance. Although most of the attention in the G20 was targeted on the relationship between the old G7 establishment and the large “emerging” market states, middle powers have been major beneficiaries of this self-selective G20 forum. Yet, despite their lead roles within the G20 as hosts and policy entrepreneurs, middle powers remain distinctive currently by not having a summit process of their own. This article examines the prospect of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Australia) acting as a platform for such a summit. Formed as a dialogue process, MIKTA remains at an early stage of its development with a cautious club culture. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and India–Brazil–South Africa, the rationale to create a distinct summit process can overcome serious constraints. As a means not only to amplify their roles with respect to the new Informalism of the twenty-first century, but also to ensure that their presence in the hub of global governance is maintained, there is logic to creating a MIKTA summit.}, note = {article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Middle powers have long been excluded from global summits. The elevation of the G20 to the leaders’ level in the context of the 2008 financial crisis marks a significant turning point for Middle Power activity in global governance. Although most of the attention in the G20 was targeted on the relationship between the old G7 establishment and the large “emerging” market states, middle powers have been major beneficiaries of this self-selective G20 forum. Yet, despite their lead roles within the G20 as hosts and policy entrepreneurs, middle powers remain distinctive currently by not having a summit process of their own. This article examines the prospect of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Australia) acting as a platform for such a summit. Formed as a dialogue process, MIKTA remains at an early stage of its development with a cautious club culture. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and India–Brazil–South Africa, the rationale to create a distinct summit process can overcome serious constraints. As a means not only to amplify their roles with respect to the new Informalism of the twenty-first century, but also to ensure that their presence in the hub of global governance is maintained, there is logic to creating a MIKTA summit. |
Alexandroff, Alan S; Brean, Donald Global Summitry: Its Meaning and Scope Part One Journal Article Global Summitry , 1 (1), pp. 1-26, 2015, (Feature). @article{Alexandroff2015, title = {Global Summitry: Its Meaning and Scope Part One}, author = {Alan S. Alexandroff and Donald Brean}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.1.1-2.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv006}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-07-20}, journal = {Global Summitry }, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {1-26}, abstract = {This article by the Senior Editors describes the scope and areas of interest of the new Global Summitry journal. Given the breadth of the topic, the article is divided into two parts, with the second to appear in the next issue. The narrative begins with an account of the current state of the global order and goes on to develop a working definition of global summitry. It looks at various facets of the concept with particular emphasis on the fact that global summitry is more than periodic, highly visible gatherings of leaders. We propose the “Iceberg Theory” of global summitry, metaphor for the substantial ongoing below-the-surface activity that gives support to the leaders’ ensemble. We distinguish global summitry from global governance while raising to prominence the many actors and international arrangements in global governance today. The article outlines the historical evolution of summitry, highlighting “revolutionary” changes over the last two hundred years. As its subtitle signals, the Journal is committed to a multidisciplinary approach that will engage economists, lawyers, and historians as well as experts in international relations.}, note = {Feature}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article by the Senior Editors describes the scope and areas of interest of the new Global Summitry journal. Given the breadth of the topic, the article is divided into two parts, with the second to appear in the next issue. The narrative begins with an account of the current state of the global order and goes on to develop a working definition of global summitry. It looks at various facets of the concept with particular emphasis on the fact that global summitry is more than periodic, highly visible gatherings of leaders. We propose the “Iceberg Theory” of global summitry, metaphor for the substantial ongoing below-the-surface activity that gives support to the leaders’ ensemble. We distinguish global summitry from global governance while raising to prominence the many actors and international arrangements in global governance today. The article outlines the historical evolution of summitry, highlighting “revolutionary” changes over the last two hundred years. As its subtitle signals, the Journal is committed to a multidisciplinary approach that will engage economists, lawyers, and historians as well as experts in international relations. |
Rimmer, Susan Harris A Critique of Australia’s G20 Presidency and the Brisbane Summit 2014 Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (1), pp. 41-63, 2015, (Article). @article{Rimmer2015, title = {A Critique of Australia’s G20 Presidency and the Brisbane Summit 2014}, author = {Susan Harris Rimmer}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.1.3.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv004}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-06-30}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {41-63}, abstract = {This article seeks to evaluate Australia as host of the Brisbane G20 Summit in 2014. The Australian G20 government, it appears, aimed to move the G20 from focusing on just responding to the financial crisis to a future growth orientation concentrating on structural reforms. To achieve this, Australia chose a narrow economic approach to the agenda. The Presidency sought to avoid engaging with broader security or climate change challenges. This effort to narrow focus and move away from a “war cabinet” approach met, however, with quite mixed success. A strong performance at the regulatory level, an emphasis on economic fundamentals and a place-branding approach to the Leaders’ Summit, all efforts of the Australian host, appear to have been insufficient for Australia’s G20 Presidency. Three additional factors seem necessary for a middle power like Australia to have impact on hosting the Leaders’ Summit: evidence of substantial and effective political leadership; a credible outreach narrative to citizens broadly that emphasizes the unique perspective of the Host; and a serious investment in the troika style leadership of the Summit. This essay raises questions over Australia’s leadership of the G20, and then examines important broader questions of G20 leadership concerned with this institution’s overall effectiveness and the success of the outreach efforts.}, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article seeks to evaluate Australia as host of the Brisbane G20 Summit in 2014. The Australian G20 government, it appears, aimed to move the G20 from focusing on just responding to the financial crisis to a future growth orientation concentrating on structural reforms. To achieve this, Australia chose a narrow economic approach to the agenda. The Presidency sought to avoid engaging with broader security or climate change challenges. This effort to narrow focus and move away from a “war cabinet” approach met, however, with quite mixed success. A strong performance at the regulatory level, an emphasis on economic fundamentals and a place-branding approach to the Leaders’ Summit, all efforts of the Australian host, appear to have been insufficient for Australia’s G20 Presidency. Three additional factors seem necessary for a middle power like Australia to have impact on hosting the Leaders’ Summit: evidence of substantial and effective political leadership; a credible outreach narrative to citizens broadly that emphasizes the unique perspective of the Host; and a serious investment in the troika style leadership of the Summit. This essay raises questions over Australia’s leadership of the G20, and then examines important broader questions of G20 leadership concerned with this institution’s overall effectiveness and the success of the outreach efforts. |
Callaghan, Mike G20 Growth Targets: Help or Hubris? Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (1), pp. 27-40, 2015, (Policy Watch). @article{Callaghan2015, title = {G20 Growth Targets: Help or Hubris? }, author = {Mike Callaghan}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.1.2.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv002}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-06-15}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {27-40}, abstract = {Notwithstanding much rhetoric from the G20, the global economy remains subpar. The new element at the 2014 Brisbane Summit was the adoption of a growth objective—lifting output by 2.1 percent in 2018. Will this be a game changer? The key is whether the policy measures tabled in Brisbane are implemented. The monitoring of progress in implementing the commitments will be central to G20 credibility. In particular, the reports presented by the IMF and OECD in 2015 must be robust, comprehensive, and transparent. But the G20 has to avoid being trapped and its credibility severely dented with false precision over the growth target. The estimates are uncertain and the country growth strategies have to be dynamic and respond to new challenges.}, note = {Policy Watch}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Notwithstanding much rhetoric from the G20, the global economy remains subpar. The new element at the 2014 Brisbane Summit was the adoption of a growth objective—lifting output by 2.1 percent in 2018. Will this be a game changer? The key is whether the policy measures tabled in Brisbane are implemented. The monitoring of progress in implementing the commitments will be central to G20 credibility. In particular, the reports presented by the IMF and OECD in 2015 must be robust, comprehensive, and transparent. But the G20 has to avoid being trapped and its credibility severely dented with false precision over the growth target. The estimates are uncertain and the country growth strategies have to be dynamic and respond to new challenges. |
Loukianova, Anya Improving Nuclear Security—One Summit at a Time Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (1), pp. 84-94, 2015, (Article). @article{Loukianova2015, title = {Improving Nuclear Security—One Summit at a Time }, author = {Anya Loukianova}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.1.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv003}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-06-15}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {84-94}, abstract = {In the spring of 2016, the United States, will welcome more than fifty world leaders to cap off a series of summits focused on reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Begun by President Obama in 2010, the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) have repeatedly tested these leaders’ ability to make ambitious national and collective pledges to secure nuclear materials and radiological sources. This article offers a background on the three past NSS, highlights some of the notable achievements of the NSS process, and discusses the remaining difficult tasks that still lie ahead.}, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } In the spring of 2016, the United States, will welcome more than fifty world leaders to cap off a series of summits focused on reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism. Begun by President Obama in 2010, the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) have repeatedly tested these leaders’ ability to make ambitious national and collective pledges to secure nuclear materials and radiological sources. This article offers a background on the three past NSS, highlights some of the notable achievements of the NSS process, and discusses the remaining difficult tasks that still lie ahead. |
Martin, Susan F International Migration and Global Governance Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (1), pp. 64-83, 2015, (Article). @article{Martin2015, title = {International Migration and Global Governance}, author = {Susan F. Martin}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.1.4.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv001}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-05-12}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {64-83}, abstract = {This article discusses: current trends in international migration, highlighting why global governance of international migration is needed; explores reasons why this form of global governance has lagged behind others; and reviews the steps that have been taken since the early twentieth century to foster greater international cooperation. In recent years, states appear more willing than before to discuss issues of mutual concern although actual decision-making on these issues remains elusive. The article concludes that although an international migration regime is unlikely to be in place any time soon, the prospects for progress in this area are better today than any time in the past century.}, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article discusses: current trends in international migration, highlighting why global governance of international migration is needed; explores reasons why this form of global governance has lagged behind others; and reviews the steps that have been taken since the early twentieth century to foster greater international cooperation. In recent years, states appear more willing than before to discuss issues of mutual concern although actual decision-making on these issues remains elusive. The article concludes that although an international migration regime is unlikely to be in place any time soon, the prospects for progress in this area are better today than any time in the past century. |
2013 |
Tiberghien, Yves; Hongcai, Xu The G20's Role in the Reform of the International Monetary System: Present Record, Potential, and Scenarios Journal Article Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. @article{Tiberghien2013, title = {The G20's Role in the Reform of the International Monetary System: Present Record, Potential, and Scenarios}, author = {Yves Tiberghien and Xu Hongcai}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Tiberghien-and-Xu.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-06-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {With the acceleration of globalization, global markets have experienced an historic period of rapid expansion. The expansion of these markets has unleashed prosperity gains around the globe, most recently in large emerging market economies. However, it is now clear that this economic globalization has far outpaced the development of finance and monetary systems. The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing years of financial volatility have brought home the deficiencies in the architecture of governance undergirding global financial markets and the inherent instability of a global monetary system that relies on one currency. In this increasingly volatile and uncertain context, it is crucial that systematically-large powers cooperate on the coordination of their macro-economic policies to prevent destructive zero-sum game behaviors, the advancement of global institutions to monitor and stabilize global financial markets, and to manage key episodes, such as the recent Eurozone difficulties. In fact, the G20 Leaders Summit was created in November 2008, in part, to secure these three key areas. This article analyzes the results, constraints, and potential of the G20 process so far. It argues that more attention should be given to the rebalancing and institutionalization of the IMS, even though it is a complex issue area, and one where optimal arrangements are hard to design and where key powers suffer from conflicting national interests.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } With the acceleration of globalization, global markets have experienced an historic period of rapid expansion. The expansion of these markets has unleashed prosperity gains around the globe, most recently in large emerging market economies. However, it is now clear that this economic globalization has far outpaced the development of finance and monetary systems. The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing years of financial volatility have brought home the deficiencies in the architecture of governance undergirding global financial markets and the inherent instability of a global monetary system that relies on one currency. In this increasingly volatile and uncertain context, it is crucial that systematically-large powers cooperate on the coordination of their macro-economic policies to prevent destructive zero-sum game behaviors, the advancement of global institutions to monitor and stabilize global financial markets, and to manage key episodes, such as the recent Eurozone difficulties. In fact, the G20 Leaders Summit was created in November 2008, in part, to secure these three key areas. This article analyzes the results, constraints, and potential of the G20 process so far. It argues that more attention should be given to the rebalancing and institutionalization of the IMS, even though it is a complex issue area, and one where optimal arrangements are hard to design and where key powers suffer from conflicting national interests. |
Cooper, Andrew; Mo, Jongryn Middle Power Leadership and the Evolution of the G20 Journal Article Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. @article{Cooper2013, title = {Middle Power Leadership and the Evolution of the G20}, author = {Andrew Cooper and Jongryn Mo}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Cooper-and-Mo.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-05-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {Global power is becoming more diffuse, smarter, and more asymmetric. In developing this extended argument, we make four points. First, the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 showed that the G20 is becoming increasingly embedded as the hub of global economic governance. Second, a strong G20 has positive attributes for global governance. Third, a main driving force for the ascent of the G20 has been and will continue to be middle power leadership. This article, therefore, will concentrate in the following on the role of Canada, Australia and South Korea but, there is some considerable potential for this role to be appropriated by other countries. Fourth, the rise of middle powers in global governance reflects the changing nature of power as well as the changing structure of the international system. We conclude with some commentary on the sustainability of middle power leadership within the evolving pattern of global governance.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Global power is becoming more diffuse, smarter, and more asymmetric. In developing this extended argument, we make four points. First, the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 showed that the G20 is becoming increasingly embedded as the hub of global economic governance. Second, a strong G20 has positive attributes for global governance. Third, a main driving force for the ascent of the G20 has been and will continue to be middle power leadership. This article, therefore, will concentrate in the following on the role of Canada, Australia and South Korea but, there is some considerable potential for this role to be appropriated by other countries. Fourth, the rise of middle powers in global governance reflects the changing nature of power as well as the changing structure of the international system. We conclude with some commentary on the sustainability of middle power leadership within the evolving pattern of global governance. |
Dobson, Hugo The Cameron Government and Gx Leadership Journal Article Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. @article{Dobson2013, title = {The Cameron Government and Gx Leadership}, author = {Hugo Dobson}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Hugo-Dobson.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-05-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {Despite the plaudits and high expectations, David Cameron’s role as a leader and innovator in Gx summitry appears overhyped. Upon closer inspection, his contribution to global summitry has lacked originality, vision, and coherence. This article will bring aspects of UK policy into relief by means of a close reading of the report Governance for Growth: Building Consensus for the Future. It will then account for these failings by relating the conclusions of this specific case study to the government’s overall foreign policy. The article focuses on the role of David Cameron and the Conservative Party specifically because, on the one hand, Gx summitry is a process that stresses the role of individual leaders; while, on the other hand, the coalition’s foreign policy appears to be an area in which the Liberal Democrats have exerted little influence as coalition partners. ‘Same bed, different dreams’ may be the political reality but little has emerged to suggest that different dreams have impacted on outcomes.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Despite the plaudits and high expectations, David Cameron’s role as a leader and innovator in Gx summitry appears overhyped. Upon closer inspection, his contribution to global summitry has lacked originality, vision, and coherence. This article will bring aspects of UK policy into relief by means of a close reading of the report Governance for Growth: Building Consensus for the Future. It will then account for these failings by relating the conclusions of this specific case study to the government’s overall foreign policy. The article focuses on the role of David Cameron and the Conservative Party specifically because, on the one hand, Gx summitry is a process that stresses the role of individual leaders; while, on the other hand, the coalition’s foreign policy appears to be an area in which the Liberal Democrats have exerted little influence as coalition partners. ‘Same bed, different dreams’ may be the political reality but little has emerged to suggest that different dreams have impacted on outcomes. |
Qobo, Mzukisi The Newly Emerging Powers and South Africa's Global Strategy Journal Article Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. @article{Qobo2013, title = {The Newly Emerging Powers and South Africa's Global Strategy}, author = {Mzukisi Qobo}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Mzukisi-Qobo.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-04-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {It is widely recognized that BRICS countries will become the main drivers of global growth in the next several decades. This economic power-shift, however, has not yet translated itself into political agenda-setting authority. The lack of congruence between political and economic power in global redistribution of power is the main theme I explore in this paper. In undertaking the critical assessment of the notion of global power redistribution I borrow from theoretical approaches associated with Susan Strange on structural (and agendasetting) power and Joseph Nye on ‘soft’ and ‘smart’ power. This paper deals in particular with two questions. The first concerns the extent to which the global power-shifts, largely occasioned by the rise of emerging powers, are changing the global landscape of ideas, norms and leadership, especially in global governance institutions such as the G20. The second dimension that this paper examines is South Africa’s place in the world, looking in particular at the country’s recent membership to the BRICS Forum, as well as its involvement in various multilateral bodies such as the G20. As such, it is interested in understanding how South Africa perceives its identity and influence in a changing world, as well as how the country is responding to global redistribution that is underway.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } It is widely recognized that BRICS countries will become the main drivers of global growth in the next several decades. This economic power-shift, however, has not yet translated itself into political agenda-setting authority. The lack of congruence between political and economic power in global redistribution of power is the main theme I explore in this paper. In undertaking the critical assessment of the notion of global power redistribution I borrow from theoretical approaches associated with Susan Strange on structural (and agendasetting) power and Joseph Nye on ‘soft’ and ‘smart’ power. This paper deals in particular with two questions. The first concerns the extent to which the global power-shifts, largely occasioned by the rise of emerging powers, are changing the global landscape of ideas, norms and leadership, especially in global governance institutions such as the G20. The second dimension that this paper examines is South Africa’s place in the world, looking in particular at the country’s recent membership to the BRICS Forum, as well as its involvement in various multilateral bodies such as the G20. As such, it is interested in understanding how South Africa perceives its identity and influence in a changing world, as well as how the country is responding to global redistribution that is underway. |
Draper, Peter The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains: Implications for Developing Countries, Trade Policy, and the G20 Journal Article Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. @article{Draper2013, title = {The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains: Implications for Developing Countries, Trade Policy, and the G20}, author = {Peter Draper}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Peter-Draper.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-04-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {This paper discusses the two broad, contradictory trends are at work in the global economy: economic globalization through multinational corporation production networks and global divergence through economic crisis policy responses. Reductions in transportation and communications costs have allowed firms to operate global value chains that take advantage of differences in national comparative advantage both through intra-firm trade and through networks that link teams of producers. Increasingly, countries specialize in tasks rather than products. This promotes global economic convergence and integration. However, the second trend pertains to economic crisis policy responses and is one of divergence. Associated with this is the ever-present threat of a destructive spiral of trade protectionism, competitive currency devaluations, and consequent disintegration. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has played a critical role in stemming the tide of protectionism. Unfortunately, WTO member states remain unable to conclude the Doha Development Round. Fortunately, the resilience and increased interdependence of the global economy also played a key role in containing protectionism. This paper will discuss the increasing importance of global production chains as reflected in the rising trade in intermediate inputs, and the steps the international community must take to successfully maintain and grow these production chains.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This paper discusses the two broad, contradictory trends are at work in the global economy: economic globalization through multinational corporation production networks and global divergence through economic crisis policy responses. Reductions in transportation and communications costs have allowed firms to operate global value chains that take advantage of differences in national comparative advantage both through intra-firm trade and through networks that link teams of producers. Increasingly, countries specialize in tasks rather than products. This promotes global economic convergence and integration. However, the second trend pertains to economic crisis policy responses and is one of divergence. Associated with this is the ever-present threat of a destructive spiral of trade protectionism, competitive currency devaluations, and consequent disintegration. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has played a critical role in stemming the tide of protectionism. Unfortunately, WTO member states remain unable to conclude the Doha Development Round. Fortunately, the resilience and increased interdependence of the global economy also played a key role in containing protectionism. This paper will discuss the increasing importance of global production chains as reflected in the rising trade in intermediate inputs, and the steps the international community must take to successfully maintain and grow these production chains. |