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1. | Rafferty, Devin T: The IMF’s “New” Institutional View: An Unwitting Trojan Horse for International Financial Fragility . In: Global Summitry, 4 (1), pp. 50-63, 2018, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Brady Bonds, Development, East Asian Financial Crisis, Economic Crisis, Economy, Financial Fragility, Financial Stability, IMF, Interest Rates, International Monetary Fund, Latin American Debt Crisis, Mexican Debt Crisis) @article{Rafferty2018, title = {The IMF’s “New” Institutional View: An Unwitting Trojan Horse for International Financial Fragility }, author = {Devin T Rafferty}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.4.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy005}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {50-63}, abstract = {In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), it became widely accepted that loosely regulated international capital flows were responsible for transmitting the crisis from the developed to the developing world. As a result, using capital controls to manage them came into vogue with many groups. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was one such actor, and its revamped policy proposals became encapsulated as its “New” Institutional View. It was here the Fund officially recognized the efficacy of controls for countering international financial fragility and stated the exact conditions under which they were acceptable. However, it also designated that authorities should retain a heavy preference for using “market-based” adjustment measures to correct capital flow-induced macroeconomic imbalances, even going as far as to mandate specific correctional paths and sequences for common individual scenarios, which indirectly relegated capital controls to secondary importance. This article argues these proposed adjustment measures are procyclical and hence the “New” Institutional View increases international financial fragility and impedes economic development. To do so, we combine Albert Hirschman’s vision of a development process with Hyman Minsky’s take on international financial instability to demonstrate this “View” is discordant with the challenges developing economies face. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {Brady Bonds, Development, East Asian Financial Crisis, Economic Crisis, Economy, Financial Fragility, Financial Stability, IMF, Interest Rates, International Monetary Fund, Latin American Debt Crisis, Mexican Debt Crisis}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), it became widely accepted that loosely regulated international capital flows were responsible for transmitting the crisis from the developed to the developing world. As a result, using capital controls to manage them came into vogue with many groups. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was one such actor, and its revamped policy proposals became encapsulated as its “New” Institutional View. It was here the Fund officially recognized the efficacy of controls for countering international financial fragility and stated the exact conditions under which they were acceptable. However, it also designated that authorities should retain a heavy preference for using “market-based” adjustment measures to correct capital flow-induced macroeconomic imbalances, even going as far as to mandate specific correctional paths and sequences for common individual scenarios, which indirectly relegated capital controls to secondary importance. This article argues these proposed adjustment measures are procyclical and hence the “New” Institutional View increases international financial fragility and impedes economic development. To do so, we combine Albert Hirschman’s vision of a development process with Hyman Minsky’s take on international financial instability to demonstrate this “View” is discordant with the challenges developing economies face. |
2. | Helleiner, Eric: Legacies of the 2008 Crisis for Global Financial Governance. In: Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 1-12, 2016, (Feature Article). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: 2008 Crisis, Cooperation, Cooperative Decentralization, Decentralization, G20, Global Financial Governance, Host Country, IMF, Multilateralism, Policymakers, Regulations) @article{Helleiner2016, title = {Legacies of the 2008 Crisis for Global Financial Governance}, author = {Eric Helleiner}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.1.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw006}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {1-12}, abstract = {What are the legacies of the 2008 financial crisis for global financial governance? One answer is that the crisis strengthened the cooperative and multilateral dimensions of international financial relations. A different interpretation is that the crisis unleashed decentralization trends. Important examples can be cited in support of both of these perspectives. After reviewing that evidence, this article highlights ways in which these two distinct legacies are working together to generate a third outcome that may well emerge as the more lasting legacy of the crisis: cooperative decentralization in global financial governance. }, note = {Feature Article}, keywords = {2008 Crisis, Cooperation, Cooperative Decentralization, Decentralization, G20, Global Financial Governance, Host Country, IMF, Multilateralism, Policymakers, Regulations}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } What are the legacies of the 2008 financial crisis for global financial governance? One answer is that the crisis strengthened the cooperative and multilateral dimensions of international financial relations. A different interpretation is that the crisis unleashed decentralization trends. Important examples can be cited in support of both of these perspectives. After reviewing that evidence, this article highlights ways in which these two distinct legacies are working together to generate a third outcome that may well emerge as the more lasting legacy of the crisis: cooperative decentralization in global financial governance. |
3. | Tiberghien, Yves; Hongcai, Xu: The G20's Role in the Reform of the International Monetary System: Present Record, Potential, and Scenarios. In: Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: 3 Ring Structure, BIS, Conflicted Virtue, Contagion Effect, Dollar Centered, Excess Global Liquidity, FSB, G20, G8, Global Economic Governance, global governance, global markets, global summitry, IMF, IMS, international affairs, international monetary system, international politics, N-1 Problem, New Triffin Dilemma, SDRs, Summits, USD, Wealth Generating Mechanism, World Bank Governance) @article{Tiberghien2013, title = {The G20's Role in the Reform of the International Monetary System: Present Record, Potential, and Scenarios}, author = {Yves Tiberghien and Xu Hongcai}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Tiberghien-and-Xu.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-06-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {With the acceleration of globalization, global markets have experienced an historic period of rapid expansion. The expansion of these markets has unleashed prosperity gains around the globe, most recently in large emerging market economies. However, it is now clear that this economic globalization has far outpaced the development of finance and monetary systems. The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing years of financial volatility have brought home the deficiencies in the architecture of governance undergirding global financial markets and the inherent instability of a global monetary system that relies on one currency. In this increasingly volatile and uncertain context, it is crucial that systematically-large powers cooperate on the coordination of their macro-economic policies to prevent destructive zero-sum game behaviors, the advancement of global institutions to monitor and stabilize global financial markets, and to manage key episodes, such as the recent Eurozone difficulties. In fact, the G20 Leaders Summit was created in November 2008, in part, to secure these three key areas. This article analyzes the results, constraints, and potential of the G20 process so far. It argues that more attention should be given to the rebalancing and institutionalization of the IMS, even though it is a complex issue area, and one where optimal arrangements are hard to design and where key powers suffer from conflicting national interests.}, keywords = {3 Ring Structure, BIS, Conflicted Virtue, Contagion Effect, Dollar Centered, Excess Global Liquidity, FSB, G20, G8, Global Economic Governance, global governance, global markets, global summitry, IMF, IMS, international affairs, international monetary system, international politics, N-1 Problem, New Triffin Dilemma, SDRs, Summits, USD, Wealth Generating Mechanism, World Bank Governance}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } With the acceleration of globalization, global markets have experienced an historic period of rapid expansion. The expansion of these markets has unleashed prosperity gains around the globe, most recently in large emerging market economies. However, it is now clear that this economic globalization has far outpaced the development of finance and monetary systems. The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing years of financial volatility have brought home the deficiencies in the architecture of governance undergirding global financial markets and the inherent instability of a global monetary system that relies on one currency. In this increasingly volatile and uncertain context, it is crucial that systematically-large powers cooperate on the coordination of their macro-economic policies to prevent destructive zero-sum game behaviors, the advancement of global institutions to monitor and stabilize global financial markets, and to manage key episodes, such as the recent Eurozone difficulties. In fact, the G20 Leaders Summit was created in November 2008, in part, to secure these three key areas. This article analyzes the results, constraints, and potential of the G20 process so far. It argues that more attention should be given to the rebalancing and institutionalization of the IMS, even though it is a complex issue area, and one where optimal arrangements are hard to design and where key powers suffer from conflicting national interests. |
2018 |
Rafferty, Devin T The IMF’s “New” Institutional View: An Unwitting Trojan Horse for International Financial Fragility Journal Article Global Summitry, 4 (1), pp. 50-63, 2018, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Rafferty2018, title = {The IMF’s “New” Institutional View: An Unwitting Trojan Horse for International Financial Fragility }, author = {Devin T Rafferty}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.4.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy005}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {50-63}, abstract = {In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), it became widely accepted that loosely regulated international capital flows were responsible for transmitting the crisis from the developed to the developing world. As a result, using capital controls to manage them came into vogue with many groups. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was one such actor, and its revamped policy proposals became encapsulated as its “New” Institutional View. It was here the Fund officially recognized the efficacy of controls for countering international financial fragility and stated the exact conditions under which they were acceptable. However, it also designated that authorities should retain a heavy preference for using “market-based” adjustment measures to correct capital flow-induced macroeconomic imbalances, even going as far as to mandate specific correctional paths and sequences for common individual scenarios, which indirectly relegated capital controls to secondary importance. This article argues these proposed adjustment measures are procyclical and hence the “New” Institutional View increases international financial fragility and impedes economic development. To do so, we combine Albert Hirschman’s vision of a development process with Hyman Minsky’s take on international financial instability to demonstrate this “View” is discordant with the challenges developing economies face. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), it became widely accepted that loosely regulated international capital flows were responsible for transmitting the crisis from the developed to the developing world. As a result, using capital controls to manage them came into vogue with many groups. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was one such actor, and its revamped policy proposals became encapsulated as its “New” Institutional View. It was here the Fund officially recognized the efficacy of controls for countering international financial fragility and stated the exact conditions under which they were acceptable. However, it also designated that authorities should retain a heavy preference for using “market-based” adjustment measures to correct capital flow-induced macroeconomic imbalances, even going as far as to mandate specific correctional paths and sequences for common individual scenarios, which indirectly relegated capital controls to secondary importance. This article argues these proposed adjustment measures are procyclical and hence the “New” Institutional View increases international financial fragility and impedes economic development. To do so, we combine Albert Hirschman’s vision of a development process with Hyman Minsky’s take on international financial instability to demonstrate this “View” is discordant with the challenges developing economies face. |
Sorry, no publications matched your criteria.
2016 |
Helleiner, Eric Legacies of the 2008 Crisis for Global Financial Governance Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 1-12, 2016, (Feature Article). @article{Helleiner2016, title = {Legacies of the 2008 Crisis for Global Financial Governance}, author = {Eric Helleiner}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.1.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw006}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {1-12}, abstract = {What are the legacies of the 2008 financial crisis for global financial governance? One answer is that the crisis strengthened the cooperative and multilateral dimensions of international financial relations. A different interpretation is that the crisis unleashed decentralization trends. Important examples can be cited in support of both of these perspectives. After reviewing that evidence, this article highlights ways in which these two distinct legacies are working together to generate a third outcome that may well emerge as the more lasting legacy of the crisis: cooperative decentralization in global financial governance. }, note = {Feature Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } What are the legacies of the 2008 financial crisis for global financial governance? One answer is that the crisis strengthened the cooperative and multilateral dimensions of international financial relations. A different interpretation is that the crisis unleashed decentralization trends. Important examples can be cited in support of both of these perspectives. After reviewing that evidence, this article highlights ways in which these two distinct legacies are working together to generate a third outcome that may well emerge as the more lasting legacy of the crisis: cooperative decentralization in global financial governance. |
Sorry, no publications matched your criteria.
2013 |
Tiberghien, Yves; Hongcai, Xu The G20's Role in the Reform of the International Monetary System: Present Record, Potential, and Scenarios Journal Article Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. @article{Tiberghien2013, title = {The G20's Role in the Reform of the International Monetary System: Present Record, Potential, and Scenarios}, author = {Yves Tiberghien and Xu Hongcai}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Tiberghien-and-Xu.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-06-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {With the acceleration of globalization, global markets have experienced an historic period of rapid expansion. The expansion of these markets has unleashed prosperity gains around the globe, most recently in large emerging market economies. However, it is now clear that this economic globalization has far outpaced the development of finance and monetary systems. The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing years of financial volatility have brought home the deficiencies in the architecture of governance undergirding global financial markets and the inherent instability of a global monetary system that relies on one currency. In this increasingly volatile and uncertain context, it is crucial that systematically-large powers cooperate on the coordination of their macro-economic policies to prevent destructive zero-sum game behaviors, the advancement of global institutions to monitor and stabilize global financial markets, and to manage key episodes, such as the recent Eurozone difficulties. In fact, the G20 Leaders Summit was created in November 2008, in part, to secure these three key areas. This article analyzes the results, constraints, and potential of the G20 process so far. It argues that more attention should be given to the rebalancing and institutionalization of the IMS, even though it is a complex issue area, and one where optimal arrangements are hard to design and where key powers suffer from conflicting national interests.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } With the acceleration of globalization, global markets have experienced an historic period of rapid expansion. The expansion of these markets has unleashed prosperity gains around the globe, most recently in large emerging market economies. However, it is now clear that this economic globalization has far outpaced the development of finance and monetary systems. The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing years of financial volatility have brought home the deficiencies in the architecture of governance undergirding global financial markets and the inherent instability of a global monetary system that relies on one currency. In this increasingly volatile and uncertain context, it is crucial that systematically-large powers cooperate on the coordination of their macro-economic policies to prevent destructive zero-sum game behaviors, the advancement of global institutions to monitor and stabilize global financial markets, and to manage key episodes, such as the recent Eurozone difficulties. In fact, the G20 Leaders Summit was created in November 2008, in part, to secure these three key areas. This article analyzes the results, constraints, and potential of the G20 process so far. It argues that more attention should be given to the rebalancing and institutionalization of the IMS, even though it is a complex issue area, and one where optimal arrangements are hard to design and where key powers suffer from conflicting national interests. |