@article{Rafferty2018,
title = {The IMF’s “New” Institutional View: An Unwitting Trojan Horse for International Financial Fragility },
author = {Devin T Rafferty},
url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.4.pdf},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy005},
issn = { 2058-7449},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-00-00},
journal = {Global Summitry},
volume = {4},
number = {1},
pages = {50-63},
abstract = {In the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), it became widely accepted that loosely regulated international capital flows were responsible for transmitting the crisis from the developed to the developing world. As a result, using capital controls to manage them came into vogue with many groups. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was one such actor, and its revamped policy proposals became encapsulated as its “New” Institutional View. It was here the Fund officially recognized the efficacy of controls for countering international financial fragility and stated the exact conditions under which they were acceptable. However, it also designated that authorities should retain a heavy preference for using “market-based” adjustment measures to correct capital flow-induced macroeconomic imbalances, even going as far as to mandate specific correctional paths and sequences for common individual scenarios, which indirectly relegated capital controls to secondary importance. This article argues these proposed adjustment measures are procyclical and hence the “New” Institutional View increases international financial fragility and impedes economic development. To do so, we combine Albert Hirschman’s vision of a development process with Hyman Minsky’s take on international financial instability to demonstrate this “View” is discordant with the challenges developing economies face.

},
note = {Article},
keywords = {Brady Bonds, Development, East Asian Financial Crisis, Economic Crisis, Economy, Financial Fragility, Financial Stability, IMF, Interest Rates, International Monetary Fund, Latin American Debt Crisis, Mexican Debt Crisis},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

@article{Helleiner2016,
title = {Legacies of the 2008 Crisis for Global Financial Governance},
author = {Eric Helleiner},
url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.1.pdf},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw006},
year = {2016},
date = {2016-00-00},
journal = {Global Summitry},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {1-12},
abstract = {What are the legacies of the 2008 financial crisis for global financial governance? One answer is that the crisis strengthened the cooperative and multilateral dimensions of international financial relations. A different interpretation is that the crisis unleashed decentralization trends. Important examples can be cited in support of both of these perspectives. After reviewing that evidence, this article highlights ways in which these two distinct legacies are working together to generate a third outcome that may well emerge as the more lasting legacy of the crisis: cooperative decentralization in global financial governance.

},
note = {Feature Article},
keywords = {2008 Crisis, Cooperation, Cooperative Decentralization, Decentralization, G20, Global Financial Governance, Host Country, IMF, Multilateralism, Policymakers, Regulations},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

@article{Tiberghien2013,
title = {The G20's Role in the Reform of the International Monetary System: Present Record, Potential, and Scenarios},
author = {Yves Tiberghien and Xu Hongcai},
url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Tiberghien-and-Xu.pdf},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-06-00},
journal = {Global Summitry - BePress},
volume = {1},
abstract = {With the acceleration of globalization, global markets have experienced an historic period of rapid expansion.
The expansion of these markets has unleashed prosperity gains around the globe, most recently in large
emerging market economies. However, it is now clear that this economic globalization has far outpaced the
development of finance and monetary systems. The 2008 global financial crisis and the ensuing years of
financial volatility have brought home the deficiencies in the architecture of governance undergirding global
financial markets and the inherent instability of a global monetary system that relies on one currency. In this
increasingly volatile and uncertain context, it is crucial that systematically-large powers cooperate on the
coordination of their macro-economic policies to prevent destructive zero-sum game behaviors, the
advancement of global institutions to monitor and stabilize global financial markets, and to manage key
episodes, such as the recent Eurozone difficulties. In fact, the G20 Leaders Summit was created in November
2008, in part, to secure these three key areas.
This article analyzes the results, constraints, and potential of the G20 process so far. It argues that more
attention should be given to the rebalancing and institutionalization of the IMS, even though it is a complex
issue area, and one where optimal arrangements are hard to design and where key powers suffer from
conflicting national interests.},
keywords = {3 Ring Structure, BIS, Conflicted Virtue, Contagion Effect, Dollar Centered, Excess Global Liquidity, FSB, G20, G8, Global Economic Governance, global governance, global markets, global summitry, IMF, IMS, international affairs, international monetary system, international politics, N-1 Problem, New Triffin Dilemma, SDRs, Summits, USD, Wealth Generating Mechanism, World Bank Governance},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}