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| 1. | Money, Jeannette; Lockhart, Sarah P: The Paucity of International Protections: Global Migration Governance in the Contemporary Era . In: Global Summitry, 3 (1), pp. 45-67, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Bilateral Cooperation, Exogenous Shocks, GCC, global governance, Global Migration, ICRMW, International Migration, migrant, Migrant Rights, Migration Patterns, Reciprocal Flows, refugee, Sending States, State Preferences) @article{Money2017, title = {The Paucity of International Protections: Global Migration Governance in the Contemporary Era }, author = { Jeannette Money and Sarah P Lockhart}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.1.3.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy007}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {45-67}, abstract = {The September 2016 UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was welcomed with much enthusiasm, as the 193 UN Member States agreed to meet yet again to negotiate a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. In the year that followed, the process of consultations and negotiations laid out in Annex II of the Declaration moved ahead at full steam (IOM 2017). What will be the substantive outcome of this process? To answer this question, we provide a theoretical framework to explain the structure of international cooperation on migration. The structure consists of five elements: the patterns of migration flows in the post-World War II period, which divide states into countries of origin and countries of destination; the status quo of customary international law that privileges countries of destination; exogenous shocks that trigger changes in the costs of the status quo; the institutionalization of the international system that permits countries of origin to project their preferences onto the international stage; and finally, the ability of countries of destination to ignore these preferences. Examples illustrate the application of the theoretical model. Will the Global Compact provide more and better interstate cooperation on migration? Or, will states largely ignore it, as they have ignored the three previous multilateral migration treaties? We argue that, unfortunately, the structure of international cooperation on migration, as just described, leads to the conclusion that this Declaration is likely to be ignored. Given the limited possibility of international cooperation, we recommend that mobilization for migrant rights should focus on the national and local levels. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {Bilateral Cooperation, Exogenous Shocks, GCC, global governance, Global Migration, ICRMW, International Migration, migrant, Migrant Rights, Migration Patterns, Reciprocal Flows, refugee, Sending States, State Preferences}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The September 2016 UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was welcomed with much enthusiasm, as the 193 UN Member States agreed to meet yet again to negotiate a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. In the year that followed, the process of consultations and negotiations laid out in Annex II of the Declaration moved ahead at full steam (IOM 2017). What will be the substantive outcome of this process? To answer this question, we provide a theoretical framework to explain the structure of international cooperation on migration. The structure consists of five elements: the patterns of migration flows in the post-World War II period, which divide states into countries of origin and countries of destination; the status quo of customary international law that privileges countries of destination; exogenous shocks that trigger changes in the costs of the status quo; the institutionalization of the international system that permits countries of origin to project their preferences onto the international stage; and finally, the ability of countries of destination to ignore these preferences. Examples illustrate the application of the theoretical model. Will the Global Compact provide more and better interstate cooperation on migration? Or, will states largely ignore it, as they have ignored the three previous multilateral migration treaties? We argue that, unfortunately, the structure of international cooperation on migration, as just described, leads to the conclusion that this Declaration is likely to be ignored. Given the limited possibility of international cooperation, we recommend that mobilization for migrant rights should focus on the national and local levels. |
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2017 |
Money, Jeannette; Lockhart, Sarah P The Paucity of International Protections: Global Migration Governance in the Contemporary Era Journal Article Global Summitry, 3 (1), pp. 45-67, 2017, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Money2017, title = {The Paucity of International Protections: Global Migration Governance in the Contemporary Era }, author = { Jeannette Money and Sarah P Lockhart}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-3.1.3.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guy007}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2017}, date = {2017-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {45-67}, abstract = {The September 2016 UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was welcomed with much enthusiasm, as the 193 UN Member States agreed to meet yet again to negotiate a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. In the year that followed, the process of consultations and negotiations laid out in Annex II of the Declaration moved ahead at full steam (IOM 2017). What will be the substantive outcome of this process? To answer this question, we provide a theoretical framework to explain the structure of international cooperation on migration. The structure consists of five elements: the patterns of migration flows in the post-World War II period, which divide states into countries of origin and countries of destination; the status quo of customary international law that privileges countries of destination; exogenous shocks that trigger changes in the costs of the status quo; the institutionalization of the international system that permits countries of origin to project their preferences onto the international stage; and finally, the ability of countries of destination to ignore these preferences. Examples illustrate the application of the theoretical model. Will the Global Compact provide more and better interstate cooperation on migration? Or, will states largely ignore it, as they have ignored the three previous multilateral migration treaties? We argue that, unfortunately, the structure of international cooperation on migration, as just described, leads to the conclusion that this Declaration is likely to be ignored. Given the limited possibility of international cooperation, we recommend that mobilization for migrant rights should focus on the national and local levels. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } The September 2016 UN New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants was welcomed with much enthusiasm, as the 193 UN Member States agreed to meet yet again to negotiate a Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. In the year that followed, the process of consultations and negotiations laid out in Annex II of the Declaration moved ahead at full steam (IOM 2017). What will be the substantive outcome of this process? To answer this question, we provide a theoretical framework to explain the structure of international cooperation on migration. The structure consists of five elements: the patterns of migration flows in the post-World War II period, which divide states into countries of origin and countries of destination; the status quo of customary international law that privileges countries of destination; exogenous shocks that trigger changes in the costs of the status quo; the institutionalization of the international system that permits countries of origin to project their preferences onto the international stage; and finally, the ability of countries of destination to ignore these preferences. Examples illustrate the application of the theoretical model. Will the Global Compact provide more and better interstate cooperation on migration? Or, will states largely ignore it, as they have ignored the three previous multilateral migration treaties? We argue that, unfortunately, the structure of international cooperation on migration, as just described, leads to the conclusion that this Declaration is likely to be ignored. Given the limited possibility of international cooperation, we recommend that mobilization for migrant rights should focus on the national and local levels. |
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