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| 1. | Cooper, Andrew F: “Rising” States and Global Reach: Measuring “Globality” among BRICS/MIKTA Countries. In: Global Summitry, 4 (2), pp. 64–80, 2019. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: BRICS, Global Projection, Globality, MIKTA, Official Development Assistance, Rising States, Trade Profile) @article{Cooper2019, title = {“Rising” States and Global Reach: Measuring “Globality” among BRICS/MIKTA Countries}, author = {Andrew F Cooper }, url = {https://globalsummitryproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/“Rising”-States-and-Global-Reach-Measuring-“Globality”-among-BRICSMIKTA-Countries.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guz002}, year = {2019}, date = {2019-07-18}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {2}, pages = {64–80}, abstract = {Global reach is equated with national ambition. In the contemporary international system, one measure of global reach for states is their inclusion in global summits. This association is particularly compelling for putative “rising” states from the Global South, among the BRICS (China, India, and Brazil) and also a less well-known forum, MIKTA (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia) groupings. Yet the standard means of examining the attributes of rising states via country specific and impressionistic studies appears to reveal that these rising powers are similar in many respects but there are significant differences as well. To help identify these differences we turn to a concept and data referred to as “globality.” We believe that this concept is helpful in more accurately analyzing the global reach of rising Global South countries. Though not that well known in the international relations literature, globality emphasizes agency by self-aware actors. Globality can be operationalized by tracing certain dimensions: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance. Broadly, the conclusion drawn from such a globality analysis substantiates a sharp distinction between the BRICS members and the MIKTA countries. The BRICS countries have some considerable capacity for global reach while it turns out that the MIKTA countries are regionally entrapped and thus less capable of global projection. Moreover, the specifics in terms of this pattern of differentiation are salient as well. The overall confirmation of an interconnection between subjective impressions of hierarchy and objective measurements of global projection, underscore the contrast between BRICS and MIKTA in summitry dynamics.}, keywords = {BRICS, Global Projection, Globality, MIKTA, Official Development Assistance, Rising States, Trade Profile}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Global reach is equated with national ambition. In the contemporary international system, one measure of global reach for states is their inclusion in global summits. This association is particularly compelling for putative “rising” states from the Global South, among the BRICS (China, India, and Brazil) and also a less well-known forum, MIKTA (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia) groupings. Yet the standard means of examining the attributes of rising states via country specific and impressionistic studies appears to reveal that these rising powers are similar in many respects but there are significant differences as well. To help identify these differences we turn to a concept and data referred to as “globality.” We believe that this concept is helpful in more accurately analyzing the global reach of rising Global South countries. Though not that well known in the international relations literature, globality emphasizes agency by self-aware actors. Globality can be operationalized by tracing certain dimensions: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance. Broadly, the conclusion drawn from such a globality analysis substantiates a sharp distinction between the BRICS members and the MIKTA countries. The BRICS countries have some considerable capacity for global reach while it turns out that the MIKTA countries are regionally entrapped and thus less capable of global projection. Moreover, the specifics in terms of this pattern of differentiation are salient as well. The overall confirmation of an interconnection between subjective impressions of hierarchy and objective measurements of global projection, underscore the contrast between BRICS and MIKTA in summitry dynamics. |
| 2. | Cooper, Andrew F: “Rising” States and Global Reach: Measuring “Globality” among BRICS/MIKTA Countries . In: Global Summitry, 4 (1), pp. 64-80, 2018, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: BRICS, G20, Global Projection, Globality, MIKTA, Official Development Assistance, Regional Entrapment, Rising States, Trade Profile, Trajectory, Turkey) @article{Cooper2018, title = {“Rising” States and Global Reach: Measuring “Globality” among BRICS/MIKTA Countries }, author = {Andrew F Cooper}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guz002}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {64-80}, abstract = {Global reach is equated with national ambition. In the contemporary international system, one measure of global reach for states is their inclusion in global summits. This association is particularly compelling for putative “rising” states from the Global South, among the BRICS (China, India, and Brazil) and also a less well-known forum, MIKTA (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia) groupings. Yet the standard means of examining the attributes of rising states via country-specific and impressionistic studies appears to reveal that these rising powers are similar in many respects but there are significant differences as well. To help identify these differences we turn to a concept and data referred to as “globality.” We believe that this concept is helpful in more accurately analyzing the global reach of rising Global South countries. Though not that well known in the international relations literature, globality emphasizes agency by self-aware actors. Globality can be operationalized by tracing certain dimensions: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance. Broadly, the conclusion drawn from such a globality analysis substantiates a sharp distinction between the BRICS members and the MIKTA countries. The BRICS countries have some considerable capacity for global reach while it turns out that the MIKTA countries are regionally entrapped and thus less capable of global projection. Moreover, the specifics in terms of this pattern of differentiation are salient as well. The overall confirmation of the interconnection between subjective impressions of hierarchy and objective measurements of global projection underscores the contrast between BRICS and MIKTA in summitry dynamics. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {BRICS, G20, Global Projection, Globality, MIKTA, Official Development Assistance, Regional Entrapment, Rising States, Trade Profile, Trajectory, Turkey}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Global reach is equated with national ambition. In the contemporary international system, one measure of global reach for states is their inclusion in global summits. This association is particularly compelling for putative “rising” states from the Global South, among the BRICS (China, India, and Brazil) and also a less well-known forum, MIKTA (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia) groupings. Yet the standard means of examining the attributes of rising states via country-specific and impressionistic studies appears to reveal that these rising powers are similar in many respects but there are significant differences as well. To help identify these differences we turn to a concept and data referred to as “globality.” We believe that this concept is helpful in more accurately analyzing the global reach of rising Global South countries. Though not that well known in the international relations literature, globality emphasizes agency by self-aware actors. Globality can be operationalized by tracing certain dimensions: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance. Broadly, the conclusion drawn from such a globality analysis substantiates a sharp distinction between the BRICS members and the MIKTA countries. The BRICS countries have some considerable capacity for global reach while it turns out that the MIKTA countries are regionally entrapped and thus less capable of global projection. Moreover, the specifics in terms of this pattern of differentiation are salient as well. The overall confirmation of the interconnection between subjective impressions of hierarchy and objective measurements of global projection underscores the contrast between BRICS and MIKTA in summitry dynamics. |
| 3. | Alden, Christopher; Schoeman, Maxi: Reconstructing South African Identity through Global Summitry . In: Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 187-204, 2016. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Apartheid, BRICS, Economic Apartheid, Foreign Policy, global summitry, Identity Formation, Jan Smuts, Liberation Struggle, NAM Conference, Nelson Mandela, South Africa, South African Identity, Two Nations Thesis) @article{Alden2016, title = {Reconstructing South African Identity through Global Summitry }, author = {Christopher Alden and Maxi Schoeman}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.2.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw001}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-03-21}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {187-204}, abstract = {This article will evaluate South Africa’s pursuit of global summitry as an expression of its own evolving national identity. Since its inception, South Africa’s multiculturalism has produced fragmentation and reconstitution of identity-based sovereignty. We argue that the contradictions which have featured in the historical processes of South African identity formation and reformation, whether from its position as a colonial bastion of white power or that of a beacon of African liberation, are both motivated by, and manifested through, its foreign policy activism in global summitry. This process lends meaning to contested domestic politics and helps shape regional and global affinities, affirming South Africa’s legitimacy as a representative of the African continent. Engaging in global summitry provides South Africa an opportunity to present a coherent purpose to audiences at home and abroad on key issues that emerge out of the country’s divided diversity. }, keywords = {Apartheid, BRICS, Economic Apartheid, Foreign Policy, global summitry, Identity Formation, Jan Smuts, Liberation Struggle, NAM Conference, Nelson Mandela, South Africa, South African Identity, Two Nations Thesis}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article will evaluate South Africa’s pursuit of global summitry as an expression of its own evolving national identity. Since its inception, South Africa’s multiculturalism has produced fragmentation and reconstitution of identity-based sovereignty. We argue that the contradictions which have featured in the historical processes of South African identity formation and reformation, whether from its position as a colonial bastion of white power or that of a beacon of African liberation, are both motivated by, and manifested through, its foreign policy activism in global summitry. This process lends meaning to contested domestic politics and helps shape regional and global affinities, affirming South Africa’s legitimacy as a representative of the African continent. Engaging in global summitry provides South Africa an opportunity to present a coherent purpose to audiences at home and abroad on key issues that emerge out of the country’s divided diversity. |
| 4. | Bradlow, Daniel D: Lessons from the Frontlines: What I Learned from My Participation in the G20. In: Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 135-150, 2016, (Summit Dialogue #1). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Balanced Growth, BRICS, Finance Track, FMCBG, G20, G20 Process, SARB, South Africa, Strong Growth, Summit Dialigue #1, Sustainable Growth) @article{Bradlow2016, title = {Lessons from the Frontlines: What I Learned from My Participation in the G20}, author = {Daniel D. Bradlow}, url = {https://academic.oup.com/globalsummitry/article-pdf/1/2/135/6988599/guv007.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv007}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-21}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {135-150}, abstract = {It is a rare privilege for an academic who has specialized in international economic institutions to get a chance to put what he researched into practice. I had this privilege when I became the first head of the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) new International Economic Relations and Policy Department. In this capacity, I represented the SARB in G20 and BRICS meetings during my approximately two years with the Bank, which concluded at the end of October 2014. My department was responsible for coordinating the SARB’s relations with the IMF. This article is my first attempt to reflect on the lessons I learned about the G20 and its relations with the countries and entities that participate in its meetings. It is divided into four sections. First, I will give a brief overview of the G20 process in order to put my experience and the lessons I learned into context. Second, I will discuss seven lessons I learned about global economic governance from the experience. Third, I will make three general observations about the G20 process. The final section is a conclusion. Two caveats are in order. First, this article contains my personal reflections on the G20 and all the opinions expressed in the article are my own. Nothing that is stated in the article should be attributed to the SARB or the South African Government. Second, central banks participate in all the meetings of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors leading up to the G20 Summit, but they do not participate in the G20 Summit itself or in the meetings of the G20 Sherpa track. My reflections and opinions, therefore, are based only on my experience as a participant in the G20 Finance track meetings.}, note = {Summit Dialogue #1}, keywords = {Balanced Growth, BRICS, Finance Track, FMCBG, G20, G20 Process, SARB, South Africa, Strong Growth, Summit Dialigue #1, Sustainable Growth}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } It is a rare privilege for an academic who has specialized in international economic institutions to get a chance to put what he researched into practice. I had this privilege when I became the first head of the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) new International Economic Relations and Policy Department. In this capacity, I represented the SARB in G20 and BRICS meetings during my approximately two years with the Bank, which concluded at the end of October 2014. My department was responsible for coordinating the SARB’s relations with the IMF. This article is my first attempt to reflect on the lessons I learned about the G20 and its relations with the countries and entities that participate in its meetings. It is divided into four sections. First, I will give a brief overview of the G20 process in order to put my experience and the lessons I learned into context. Second, I will discuss seven lessons I learned about global economic governance from the experience. Third, I will make three general observations about the G20 process. The final section is a conclusion. Two caveats are in order. First, this article contains my personal reflections on the G20 and all the opinions expressed in the article are my own. Nothing that is stated in the article should be attributed to the SARB or the South African Government. Second, central banks participate in all the meetings of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors leading up to the G20 Summit, but they do not participate in the G20 Summit itself or in the meetings of the G20 Sherpa track. My reflections and opinions, therefore, are based only on my experience as a participant in the G20 Finance track meetings. |
| 5. | Stuenkel, Oliver: The BRICS: Seeking Privileges by Constructing and Running Multilateral Institutions . In: Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 38-53, 2016, (Article). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: BRICS, China, Crimea, Leviathan, Multilateral Institutions, Non-Western, Privileges of Leadership, Russia, The West, United States, Western) @article{Stuenkel2016, title = {The BRICS: Seeking Privileges by Constructing and Running Multilateral Institutions }, author = {Oliver Stuenkel}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw008}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {38-53}, abstract = {How should we think of the decisions made by China and the other BRICS countries to establish a series of new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB)? Does such activism show that rising powers are embracing or confronting today’s Western-led order? This article argues that rather than analyzing emerging powers’ beliefs about rules and norms, these new institutions can best be understood as a tool to enhance their capacity to gain privileges of leadership, and slowly reduce the United States’ institutional centrality which provides it with a hegemonic privilege. Such privilege is seen to allow states to break the rules without asking for a “permission slip” and without fearing institutional punishment. The proliferation of non-Western institutions would appear to complement existing ones and allow rising powers to engage in forum shopping on a trans-regional level. Such forum shopping for the BRICS would seem to provide advantages, including reducing their dependence on Western-led institutions when they are perceived by the BRICS and others to serve the interests of established powers. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {BRICS, China, Crimea, Leviathan, Multilateral Institutions, Non-Western, Privileges of Leadership, Russia, The West, United States, Western}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } How should we think of the decisions made by China and the other BRICS countries to establish a series of new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB)? Does such activism show that rising powers are embracing or confronting today’s Western-led order? This article argues that rather than analyzing emerging powers’ beliefs about rules and norms, these new institutions can best be understood as a tool to enhance their capacity to gain privileges of leadership, and slowly reduce the United States’ institutional centrality which provides it with a hegemonic privilege. Such privilege is seen to allow states to break the rules without asking for a “permission slip” and without fearing institutional punishment. The proliferation of non-Western institutions would appear to complement existing ones and allow rising powers to engage in forum shopping on a trans-regional level. Such forum shopping for the BRICS would seem to provide advantages, including reducing their dependence on Western-led institutions when they are perceived by the BRICS and others to serve the interests of established powers. |
| 6. | Cooper, Andrew F: MIKTA and the Global Projection of Middle Powers: Toward a Summit of Their Own? . In: Global Summitry, 1 (1), pp. 95-114, 2015, (article). (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: BRICS, Collective Action, G20, G7, global governance, Global Projection, middle powers, MIKTA, Multipolarism, Rise of the Informals) @article{Cooper2015, title = {MIKTA and the Global Projection of Middle Powers: Toward a Summit of Their Own? }, author = {Andrew F. Cooper}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.1.6.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv005}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-07-28}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {95-114}, abstract = {Middle powers have long been excluded from global summits. The elevation of the G20 to the leaders’ level in the context of the 2008 financial crisis marks a significant turning point for Middle Power activity in global governance. Although most of the attention in the G20 was targeted on the relationship between the old G7 establishment and the large “emerging” market states, middle powers have been major beneficiaries of this self-selective G20 forum. Yet, despite their lead roles within the G20 as hosts and policy entrepreneurs, middle powers remain distinctive currently by not having a summit process of their own. This article examines the prospect of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Australia) acting as a platform for such a summit. Formed as a dialogue process, MIKTA remains at an early stage of its development with a cautious club culture. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and India–Brazil–South Africa, the rationale to create a distinct summit process can overcome serious constraints. As a means not only to amplify their roles with respect to the new Informalism of the twenty-first century, but also to ensure that their presence in the hub of global governance is maintained, there is logic to creating a MIKTA summit.}, note = {article}, keywords = {BRICS, Collective Action, G20, G7, global governance, Global Projection, middle powers, MIKTA, Multipolarism, Rise of the Informals}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Middle powers have long been excluded from global summits. The elevation of the G20 to the leaders’ level in the context of the 2008 financial crisis marks a significant turning point for Middle Power activity in global governance. Although most of the attention in the G20 was targeted on the relationship between the old G7 establishment and the large “emerging” market states, middle powers have been major beneficiaries of this self-selective G20 forum. Yet, despite their lead roles within the G20 as hosts and policy entrepreneurs, middle powers remain distinctive currently by not having a summit process of their own. This article examines the prospect of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Australia) acting as a platform for such a summit. Formed as a dialogue process, MIKTA remains at an early stage of its development with a cautious club culture. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and India–Brazil–South Africa, the rationale to create a distinct summit process can overcome serious constraints. As a means not only to amplify their roles with respect to the new Informalism of the twenty-first century, but also to ensure that their presence in the hub of global governance is maintained, there is logic to creating a MIKTA summit. |
| 7. | Cooper, Andrew; Mo, Jongryn: Middle Power Leadership and the Evolution of the G20. In: Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: BRICS, economics, eurocrisis, G20, G8, global governance, global summitry, great powers, international, international affairs, international politics, middle powers) @article{Cooper2013, title = {Middle Power Leadership and the Evolution of the G20}, author = {Andrew Cooper and Jongryn Mo}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Cooper-and-Mo.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-05-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {Global power is becoming more diffuse, smarter, and more asymmetric. In developing this extended argument, we make four points. First, the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 showed that the G20 is becoming increasingly embedded as the hub of global economic governance. Second, a strong G20 has positive attributes for global governance. Third, a main driving force for the ascent of the G20 has been and will continue to be middle power leadership. This article, therefore, will concentrate in the following on the role of Canada, Australia and South Korea but, there is some considerable potential for this role to be appropriated by other countries. Fourth, the rise of middle powers in global governance reflects the changing nature of power as well as the changing structure of the international system. We conclude with some commentary on the sustainability of middle power leadership within the evolving pattern of global governance.}, keywords = {BRICS, economics, eurocrisis, G20, G8, global governance, global summitry, great powers, international, international affairs, international politics, middle powers}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Global power is becoming more diffuse, smarter, and more asymmetric. In developing this extended argument, we make four points. First, the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 showed that the G20 is becoming increasingly embedded as the hub of global economic governance. Second, a strong G20 has positive attributes for global governance. Third, a main driving force for the ascent of the G20 has been and will continue to be middle power leadership. This article, therefore, will concentrate in the following on the role of Canada, Australia and South Korea but, there is some considerable potential for this role to be appropriated by other countries. Fourth, the rise of middle powers in global governance reflects the changing nature of power as well as the changing structure of the international system. We conclude with some commentary on the sustainability of middle power leadership within the evolving pattern of global governance. |
| 8. | Qobo, Mzukisi: The Newly Emerging Powers and South Africa's Global Strategy. In: Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. (Type: Journal Article | Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Brazil, BRIC, BRICS, China, emerging powers, G20, G8, global governance, global strategy, global summitry, Goldman Sachs, India, international affairs, middle powers, N-11, Russia, South Africa, structural power) @article{Qobo2013, title = {The Newly Emerging Powers and South Africa's Global Strategy}, author = {Mzukisi Qobo}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Mzukisi-Qobo.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-04-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {It is widely recognized that BRICS countries will become the main drivers of global growth in the next several decades. This economic power-shift, however, has not yet translated itself into political agenda-setting authority. The lack of congruence between political and economic power in global redistribution of power is the main theme I explore in this paper. In undertaking the critical assessment of the notion of global power redistribution I borrow from theoretical approaches associated with Susan Strange on structural (and agendasetting) power and Joseph Nye on ‘soft’ and ‘smart’ power. This paper deals in particular with two questions. The first concerns the extent to which the global power-shifts, largely occasioned by the rise of emerging powers, are changing the global landscape of ideas, norms and leadership, especially in global governance institutions such as the G20. The second dimension that this paper examines is South Africa’s place in the world, looking in particular at the country’s recent membership to the BRICS Forum, as well as its involvement in various multilateral bodies such as the G20. As such, it is interested in understanding how South Africa perceives its identity and influence in a changing world, as well as how the country is responding to global redistribution that is underway.}, keywords = {Brazil, BRIC, BRICS, China, emerging powers, G20, G8, global governance, global strategy, global summitry, Goldman Sachs, India, international affairs, middle powers, N-11, Russia, South Africa, structural power}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } It is widely recognized that BRICS countries will become the main drivers of global growth in the next several decades. This economic power-shift, however, has not yet translated itself into political agenda-setting authority. The lack of congruence between political and economic power in global redistribution of power is the main theme I explore in this paper. In undertaking the critical assessment of the notion of global power redistribution I borrow from theoretical approaches associated with Susan Strange on structural (and agendasetting) power and Joseph Nye on ‘soft’ and ‘smart’ power. This paper deals in particular with two questions. The first concerns the extent to which the global power-shifts, largely occasioned by the rise of emerging powers, are changing the global landscape of ideas, norms and leadership, especially in global governance institutions such as the G20. The second dimension that this paper examines is South Africa’s place in the world, looking in particular at the country’s recent membership to the BRICS Forum, as well as its involvement in various multilateral bodies such as the G20. As such, it is interested in understanding how South Africa perceives its identity and influence in a changing world, as well as how the country is responding to global redistribution that is underway. |
2018 |
Cooper, Andrew F “Rising” States and Global Reach: Measuring “Globality” among BRICS/MIKTA Countries Journal Article Global Summitry, 4 (1), pp. 64-80, 2018, ISSN: 2058-7449, (Article). @article{Cooper2018, title = {“Rising” States and Global Reach: Measuring “Globality” among BRICS/MIKTA Countries }, author = {Andrew F Cooper}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-4.1.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guz002}, issn = { 2058-7449}, year = {2018}, date = {2018-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {64-80}, abstract = {Global reach is equated with national ambition. In the contemporary international system, one measure of global reach for states is their inclusion in global summits. This association is particularly compelling for putative “rising” states from the Global South, among the BRICS (China, India, and Brazil) and also a less well-known forum, MIKTA (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia) groupings. Yet the standard means of examining the attributes of rising states via country-specific and impressionistic studies appears to reveal that these rising powers are similar in many respects but there are significant differences as well. To help identify these differences we turn to a concept and data referred to as “globality.” We believe that this concept is helpful in more accurately analyzing the global reach of rising Global South countries. Though not that well known in the international relations literature, globality emphasizes agency by self-aware actors. Globality can be operationalized by tracing certain dimensions: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance. Broadly, the conclusion drawn from such a globality analysis substantiates a sharp distinction between the BRICS members and the MIKTA countries. The BRICS countries have some considerable capacity for global reach while it turns out that the MIKTA countries are regionally entrapped and thus less capable of global projection. Moreover, the specifics in terms of this pattern of differentiation are salient as well. The overall confirmation of the interconnection between subjective impressions of hierarchy and objective measurements of global projection underscores the contrast between BRICS and MIKTA in summitry dynamics. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Global reach is equated with national ambition. In the contemporary international system, one measure of global reach for states is their inclusion in global summits. This association is particularly compelling for putative “rising” states from the Global South, among the BRICS (China, India, and Brazil) and also a less well-known forum, MIKTA (Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Indonesia) groupings. Yet the standard means of examining the attributes of rising states via country-specific and impressionistic studies appears to reveal that these rising powers are similar in many respects but there are significant differences as well. To help identify these differences we turn to a concept and data referred to as “globality.” We believe that this concept is helpful in more accurately analyzing the global reach of rising Global South countries. Though not that well known in the international relations literature, globality emphasizes agency by self-aware actors. Globality can be operationalized by tracing certain dimensions: institutional/diplomatic range; trade profile; and the trajectory of official development assistance. Broadly, the conclusion drawn from such a globality analysis substantiates a sharp distinction between the BRICS members and the MIKTA countries. The BRICS countries have some considerable capacity for global reach while it turns out that the MIKTA countries are regionally entrapped and thus less capable of global projection. Moreover, the specifics in terms of this pattern of differentiation are salient as well. The overall confirmation of the interconnection between subjective impressions of hierarchy and objective measurements of global projection underscores the contrast between BRICS and MIKTA in summitry dynamics. |
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2016 |
Alden, Christopher; Schoeman, Maxi Reconstructing South African Identity through Global Summitry Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 187-204, 2016. @article{Alden2016, title = {Reconstructing South African Identity through Global Summitry }, author = {Christopher Alden and Maxi Schoeman}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.2.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw001}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-03-21}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {187-204}, abstract = {This article will evaluate South Africa’s pursuit of global summitry as an expression of its own evolving national identity. Since its inception, South Africa’s multiculturalism has produced fragmentation and reconstitution of identity-based sovereignty. We argue that the contradictions which have featured in the historical processes of South African identity formation and reformation, whether from its position as a colonial bastion of white power or that of a beacon of African liberation, are both motivated by, and manifested through, its foreign policy activism in global summitry. This process lends meaning to contested domestic politics and helps shape regional and global affinities, affirming South Africa’s legitimacy as a representative of the African continent. Engaging in global summitry provides South Africa an opportunity to present a coherent purpose to audiences at home and abroad on key issues that emerge out of the country’s divided diversity. }, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } This article will evaluate South Africa’s pursuit of global summitry as an expression of its own evolving national identity. Since its inception, South Africa’s multiculturalism has produced fragmentation and reconstitution of identity-based sovereignty. We argue that the contradictions which have featured in the historical processes of South African identity formation and reformation, whether from its position as a colonial bastion of white power or that of a beacon of African liberation, are both motivated by, and manifested through, its foreign policy activism in global summitry. This process lends meaning to contested domestic politics and helps shape regional and global affinities, affirming South Africa’s legitimacy as a representative of the African continent. Engaging in global summitry provides South Africa an opportunity to present a coherent purpose to audiences at home and abroad on key issues that emerge out of the country’s divided diversity. |
Bradlow, Daniel D Lessons from the Frontlines: What I Learned from My Participation in the G20 Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (2), pp. 135-150, 2016, (Summit Dialogue #1). @article{Bradlow2016, title = {Lessons from the Frontlines: What I Learned from My Participation in the G20}, author = {Daniel D. Bradlow}, url = {https://academic.oup.com/globalsummitry/article-pdf/1/2/135/6988599/guv007.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv007}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-01-21}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {135-150}, abstract = {It is a rare privilege for an academic who has specialized in international economic institutions to get a chance to put what he researched into practice. I had this privilege when I became the first head of the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) new International Economic Relations and Policy Department. In this capacity, I represented the SARB in G20 and BRICS meetings during my approximately two years with the Bank, which concluded at the end of October 2014. My department was responsible for coordinating the SARB’s relations with the IMF. This article is my first attempt to reflect on the lessons I learned about the G20 and its relations with the countries and entities that participate in its meetings. It is divided into four sections. First, I will give a brief overview of the G20 process in order to put my experience and the lessons I learned into context. Second, I will discuss seven lessons I learned about global economic governance from the experience. Third, I will make three general observations about the G20 process. The final section is a conclusion. Two caveats are in order. First, this article contains my personal reflections on the G20 and all the opinions expressed in the article are my own. Nothing that is stated in the article should be attributed to the SARB or the South African Government. Second, central banks participate in all the meetings of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors leading up to the G20 Summit, but they do not participate in the G20 Summit itself or in the meetings of the G20 Sherpa track. My reflections and opinions, therefore, are based only on my experience as a participant in the G20 Finance track meetings.}, note = {Summit Dialogue #1}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } It is a rare privilege for an academic who has specialized in international economic institutions to get a chance to put what he researched into practice. I had this privilege when I became the first head of the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) new International Economic Relations and Policy Department. In this capacity, I represented the SARB in G20 and BRICS meetings during my approximately two years with the Bank, which concluded at the end of October 2014. My department was responsible for coordinating the SARB’s relations with the IMF. This article is my first attempt to reflect on the lessons I learned about the G20 and its relations with the countries and entities that participate in its meetings. It is divided into four sections. First, I will give a brief overview of the G20 process in order to put my experience and the lessons I learned into context. Second, I will discuss seven lessons I learned about global economic governance from the experience. Third, I will make three general observations about the G20 process. The final section is a conclusion. Two caveats are in order. First, this article contains my personal reflections on the G20 and all the opinions expressed in the article are my own. Nothing that is stated in the article should be attributed to the SARB or the South African Government. Second, central banks participate in all the meetings of the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors leading up to the G20 Summit, but they do not participate in the G20 Summit itself or in the meetings of the G20 Sherpa track. My reflections and opinions, therefore, are based only on my experience as a participant in the G20 Finance track meetings. |
Stuenkel, Oliver The BRICS: Seeking Privileges by Constructing and Running Multilateral Institutions Journal Article Global Summitry, 2 (1), pp. 38-53, 2016, (Article). @article{Stuenkel2016, title = {The BRICS: Seeking Privileges by Constructing and Running Multilateral Institutions }, author = {Oliver Stuenkel}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-2.1.5.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw008}, year = {2016}, date = {2016-00-00}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {38-53}, abstract = {How should we think of the decisions made by China and the other BRICS countries to establish a series of new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB)? Does such activism show that rising powers are embracing or confronting today’s Western-led order? This article argues that rather than analyzing emerging powers’ beliefs about rules and norms, these new institutions can best be understood as a tool to enhance their capacity to gain privileges of leadership, and slowly reduce the United States’ institutional centrality which provides it with a hegemonic privilege. Such privilege is seen to allow states to break the rules without asking for a “permission slip” and without fearing institutional punishment. The proliferation of non-Western institutions would appear to complement existing ones and allow rising powers to engage in forum shopping on a trans-regional level. Such forum shopping for the BRICS would seem to provide advantages, including reducing their dependence on Western-led institutions when they are perceived by the BRICS and others to serve the interests of established powers. }, note = {Article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } How should we think of the decisions made by China and the other BRICS countries to establish a series of new institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB)? Does such activism show that rising powers are embracing or confronting today’s Western-led order? This article argues that rather than analyzing emerging powers’ beliefs about rules and norms, these new institutions can best be understood as a tool to enhance their capacity to gain privileges of leadership, and slowly reduce the United States’ institutional centrality which provides it with a hegemonic privilege. Such privilege is seen to allow states to break the rules without asking for a “permission slip” and without fearing institutional punishment. The proliferation of non-Western institutions would appear to complement existing ones and allow rising powers to engage in forum shopping on a trans-regional level. Such forum shopping for the BRICS would seem to provide advantages, including reducing their dependence on Western-led institutions when they are perceived by the BRICS and others to serve the interests of established powers. |
2015 |
Cooper, Andrew F MIKTA and the Global Projection of Middle Powers: Toward a Summit of Their Own? Journal Article Global Summitry, 1 (1), pp. 95-114, 2015, (article). @article{Cooper2015, title = {MIKTA and the Global Projection of Middle Powers: Toward a Summit of Their Own? }, author = {Andrew F. Cooper}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GSP-1.1.6.pdf}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guv005}, year = {2015}, date = {2015-07-28}, journal = {Global Summitry}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {95-114}, abstract = {Middle powers have long been excluded from global summits. The elevation of the G20 to the leaders’ level in the context of the 2008 financial crisis marks a significant turning point for Middle Power activity in global governance. Although most of the attention in the G20 was targeted on the relationship between the old G7 establishment and the large “emerging” market states, middle powers have been major beneficiaries of this self-selective G20 forum. Yet, despite their lead roles within the G20 as hosts and policy entrepreneurs, middle powers remain distinctive currently by not having a summit process of their own. This article examines the prospect of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Australia) acting as a platform for such a summit. Formed as a dialogue process, MIKTA remains at an early stage of its development with a cautious club culture. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and India–Brazil–South Africa, the rationale to create a distinct summit process can overcome serious constraints. As a means not only to amplify their roles with respect to the new Informalism of the twenty-first century, but also to ensure that their presence in the hub of global governance is maintained, there is logic to creating a MIKTA summit.}, note = {article}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Middle powers have long been excluded from global summits. The elevation of the G20 to the leaders’ level in the context of the 2008 financial crisis marks a significant turning point for Middle Power activity in global governance. Although most of the attention in the G20 was targeted on the relationship between the old G7 establishment and the large “emerging” market states, middle powers have been major beneficiaries of this self-selective G20 forum. Yet, despite their lead roles within the G20 as hosts and policy entrepreneurs, middle powers remain distinctive currently by not having a summit process of their own. This article examines the prospect of MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey, and Australia) acting as a platform for such a summit. Formed as a dialogue process, MIKTA remains at an early stage of its development with a cautious club culture. Nonetheless, as demonstrated by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and India–Brazil–South Africa, the rationale to create a distinct summit process can overcome serious constraints. As a means not only to amplify their roles with respect to the new Informalism of the twenty-first century, but also to ensure that their presence in the hub of global governance is maintained, there is logic to creating a MIKTA summit. |
2013 |
Cooper, Andrew; Mo, Jongryn Middle Power Leadership and the Evolution of the G20 Journal Article Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. @article{Cooper2013, title = {Middle Power Leadership and the Evolution of the G20}, author = {Andrew Cooper and Jongryn Mo}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Cooper-and-Mo.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-05-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {Global power is becoming more diffuse, smarter, and more asymmetric. In developing this extended argument, we make four points. First, the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 showed that the G20 is becoming increasingly embedded as the hub of global economic governance. Second, a strong G20 has positive attributes for global governance. Third, a main driving force for the ascent of the G20 has been and will continue to be middle power leadership. This article, therefore, will concentrate in the following on the role of Canada, Australia and South Korea but, there is some considerable potential for this role to be appropriated by other countries. Fourth, the rise of middle powers in global governance reflects the changing nature of power as well as the changing structure of the international system. We conclude with some commentary on the sustainability of middle power leadership within the evolving pattern of global governance.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } Global power is becoming more diffuse, smarter, and more asymmetric. In developing this extended argument, we make four points. First, the G20 Seoul Summit in November 2010 showed that the G20 is becoming increasingly embedded as the hub of global economic governance. Second, a strong G20 has positive attributes for global governance. Third, a main driving force for the ascent of the G20 has been and will continue to be middle power leadership. This article, therefore, will concentrate in the following on the role of Canada, Australia and South Korea but, there is some considerable potential for this role to be appropriated by other countries. Fourth, the rise of middle powers in global governance reflects the changing nature of power as well as the changing structure of the international system. We conclude with some commentary on the sustainability of middle power leadership within the evolving pattern of global governance. |
Qobo, Mzukisi The Newly Emerging Powers and South Africa's Global Strategy Journal Article Global Summitry - BePress, 1 , 2013. @article{Qobo2013, title = {The Newly Emerging Powers and South Africa's Global Strategy}, author = {Mzukisi Qobo}, url = {http://globalsummitry.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Mzukisi-Qobo.pdf}, year = {2013}, date = {2013-04-00}, journal = {Global Summitry - BePress}, volume = {1}, abstract = {It is widely recognized that BRICS countries will become the main drivers of global growth in the next several decades. This economic power-shift, however, has not yet translated itself into political agenda-setting authority. The lack of congruence between political and economic power in global redistribution of power is the main theme I explore in this paper. In undertaking the critical assessment of the notion of global power redistribution I borrow from theoretical approaches associated with Susan Strange on structural (and agendasetting) power and Joseph Nye on ‘soft’ and ‘smart’ power. This paper deals in particular with two questions. The first concerns the extent to which the global power-shifts, largely occasioned by the rise of emerging powers, are changing the global landscape of ideas, norms and leadership, especially in global governance institutions such as the G20. The second dimension that this paper examines is South Africa’s place in the world, looking in particular at the country’s recent membership to the BRICS Forum, as well as its involvement in various multilateral bodies such as the G20. As such, it is interested in understanding how South Africa perceives its identity and influence in a changing world, as well as how the country is responding to global redistribution that is underway.}, keywords = {}, pubstate = {published}, tppubtype = {article} } It is widely recognized that BRICS countries will become the main drivers of global growth in the next several decades. This economic power-shift, however, has not yet translated itself into political agenda-setting authority. The lack of congruence between political and economic power in global redistribution of power is the main theme I explore in this paper. In undertaking the critical assessment of the notion of global power redistribution I borrow from theoretical approaches associated with Susan Strange on structural (and agendasetting) power and Joseph Nye on ‘soft’ and ‘smart’ power. This paper deals in particular with two questions. The first concerns the extent to which the global power-shifts, largely occasioned by the rise of emerging powers, are changing the global landscape of ideas, norms and leadership, especially in global governance institutions such as the G20. The second dimension that this paper examines is South Africa’s place in the world, looking in particular at the country’s recent membership to the BRICS Forum, as well as its involvement in various multilateral bodies such as the G20. As such, it is interested in understanding how South Africa perceives its identity and influence in a changing world, as well as how the country is responding to global redistribution that is underway. |